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Uncertainty is an important determinant of economic developments at both micro and
macroeconomic levels. The main objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of economic
and model uncertainty, paying close attention to financial factors as a key mechanism that
propagates and amplifies business cycle movements.
The first part of the thesis studies the impact of uncertainty on bank assets portfolios allo-
cation. In chapter 1 I do this empirically by estimating a set of vector autoregression models.
I show that a positive shock to uncertainty leads to reallocation of portfolios by commercial
banks: they reduce issuance of business loans, while increasing the stock of safe assets - cash
and Treasury and agency securities. I also demonstrate that when risk, uncertainty and bal-
ance sheet factors are controlled for, business loans decrease after monetary tightening, what
allows to resolve the puzzle raised by den Haan et al. (2007) that business loans increase
following monetary contraction.
In chapter 2 I examine the relationship between economic uncertainty and asset portfolio
allocation of banks in a theoretical model. The model incorporates a portfolio-optimizing
banking sector facing non-diversifiable credit risk, where banks’ attitude to risk and expected
profitability help to explain the endogenous movements of the risk premium. The premium
charged by risk-averse banks provides self-insurance from profitability reduction brought
about by heightened uncertainty about entrepreneurial productivity. Financial accelerator
mechanism amplifies the portfolio reallocation effect of uncertainty shock.
In the second part of the thesis I study how financial frictions affect robustness of mone-
tary policy rules in New Keynesian models in case of model uncertainty. I demonstrate that
when there is uncertainty about what type of financial frictions is at work, a policymaker
exposes economy to risks of significant welfare losses by using a reference model without
frictions as an economy representation.
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Introduction
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of economic activity. The results of most economic opera-
tions and developments are uncertain. This pertains, for example, to profitability outcomes
of economic agents, to behaviour of counterparties or to the future dynamics of the main
macroeconomic aggregates. Besides, due to the fact that economic models are necessarily a
simplification of reality, there is uncertainty about which model represents the economy in
the best way. This latter type of uncertainty is commonly referred to as model uncertainty.
The two types of uncertainty that I deal with in this dissertation are uncertainty about fu-
ture developments of economy, referred to as economic uncertainty hereinafter, and model
uncertainty.
There is a distinction between the concepts of risk and uncertainty in economic literature.
According to Frank Knight, who introduced this differentiation1, the term ’risk’ is used in the
cases, when the degree of unknownness could be quantified probabilistically. Otherwise the
term ‘uncertainty’ is used. This difference is, however, blurred in macroeconomic literature
today, given that there are approaches to measure uncertainty in probabilistic terms. This
is, for example, a commonly used VIX/VXO index as an uncertainty measure that captures
the implied volatility of stock market. Time-varying volatility of economic variables is also
frequently referred to as a source of uncertainty2. Following this established practice of
macroeconomic literature, I use the term ‘uncertainty’ in its broad sense in this dissertation,
meaning that uncertainty captures, among others, the case of time-varying volatility.
Economic uncertainty plays a crucial role in affecting economic developments. The changes
in volatility and uncertainty are shown to be quantitatively significant factors in business
cycle movements and a key element in successful explanation of aggregate fluctuations3.
Notably, it has been demonstrated that uncertainty had a critical effect on various variables
during the financial crisis of 2007-20094. The negative effect of heightened uncertainty on
economic activity is also found in microeconomic data5.
1In Knight’s words, "There is a fundamental distinction between the reward for taking a known risk and that
for assuming a risk whose value itself is not known. It is so fundamental, indeed, that ... a known risk will not
lead to any reward or special payment at all” (Knight, 2009).
2See, among others, Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2016), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Born and Pfeifer
(2014), Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2015) on this.
3The negative effect of uncertainty on aggregate variables is found in Romer (1990), Ramey and Ramey (1995),
Bussiere and Mulder (2000), Bachman et al. (2010), Popescu and Smets (2010), Baker and Bloom (2011), Drechsler
and Yaron (2011), Novy and Taylor (2012), Mody et al. (2012), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2014), Born and Pfeifer
(2014).
4See, for example, Stock and Watson (2013) and Christiano et al. (2014) on this.
5Microeconomic evidence suggests that heightened uncertainty has negative impact on firms level investment
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Financial frictions is another critical factor that determines the dynamics of economic ag-
gregates. A number of studies reveal the empirical relevance of financial accelerator mech-
anism6. Other works demonstrate the evidence supporting significance of collateral con-
straints as a factor behind aggregate fluctuations7, while some papers emphasize the impor-
tance of disruptions of financial intermediation8, contagion transmission9, asset price bub-
bles10 or credit shocks11. The case of the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 and its causes
is especially important given its adverse and far-reaching consequences, and it has been ac-
knowledged that financial factors have contributed significantly into the recent economic
decline12. As a result, various models with distinct types of financial frictions emerged in
an attempt to capture the relevant economic mechanisms that represent economy at work.
Thereby the issue of model uncertainty arises. This issue is especially relevant in turbulent
times, when uncertainty is high, as it becomes more complicated to ascertain which amplifi-
cation mechanisms are conductive to economic fluctuations.
Taking into account the critical role that financial frictions and uncertainty play in de-
termining the path of economic developments, a natural question of their interaction arises.
This interaction is interesting, because it opens the space for taking into account the impor-
tant channels, via which financial and uncertainty conditions have an effect on real activity.
The first channel is procyclicality of capital markets, or allowing asset prices to have an im-
pact while feeding back to real economy. A mechanism that delivers this outcome could
arise due to asymmetric information and agency frictions. Specifically, in bad times, when
firms’ balance sheets are weak and the collateral value is low, the cost of external finance
goes up, what results in decreasing availability of funds and amplification of shocks hitting
the real sectors of economy13. Elevated uncertainty about firms’ productivity exacerbates
frictions associated with asymmetric information and has a potential to work in two direc-
tions. First, when future returns are subject to uncertainty, companies are likely to change
their demand for input factors of production; this pattern is captured by the real options or
wait-and-see effect of uncertainty, suggested in theoretical literature by Bernanke (1983) and
Brennan and Schartz (1985)14. This channel is studied empirically and theoretically in Alfaro
– see Leahy and Whited (1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999), Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007), Bond et al. (2005),
Stein and Stone (2010), Baum et al. (2010). Negative effect on investment of industries is shown in Caballero
and Pindyck (1993), Huizinga (1993), Ghosal and Loungani (1996). Carol and Dunn (1997), Foot et al. (2000)
and Bertolla et al. (2005) demonstrate that consumers’ spending also react negatively influenced by an elevated
uncertainty.
6Bernanke et al. (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Mody and Taylor (2004), Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010),
Peersman and Smets (2005), Almeida et al. (2006), and Cavalcanti (2010).
7See among others, Fazzari et al. (1988), Gertler et al. (1991), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard et al.
(1995), and Kashyap et al. (1994).
8See Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Balke and
Zeng (2013).
9See Mendoza and Quadrini (2010).
10See Farhi and Tirole (2011), and Martin and Ventura (2011).
11See Christiano et al. (2008), and Del Negro et al. (2010) for details.
12See, among others, Stock and Watson (2012), Caldara et al. (2016), Balke and Zeng (2013), Krishnamurthy
(2010), Geanakoplos (2009), Chatterjee (2010) and Peralta-Alva (2011 a,b).
13This transmission mechanism draws from financial accelerator hypothesis of Bernanke et al. (1999).
14I discuss various theoretical mechanisms via which uncertainty has an impact on real economy in more
details in the current section below.
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et al. (2016), who demonstrate that in presence of financial frictions the negative impact of
uncertainty shocks on investment and hiring nearly doubles. In addition to real options ef-
fect, they emphasize the significant impact of uncertainty on firms’ cash hoarding and debt
cutting to hedge against future shocks, what reduces investment and hiring further. The im-
portance of frictions in presence of uncertainty is corroborated in this study by the evidence
that the strongest effect of elevated uncertainty is attained for the most financial constrained
firms. Second, along the lines with Arellano et al. (2010) and Gilchrist et al. (2011), there’s
a downward pressure on the supply of capital when uncertainty is heightened, as the value
of the collateral becomes more uncertain. An additional amplification mechanism due to
misperception of uncertainty and risks by financial intermediaries is suggested by Borio
et al. (2001). This paper argues that in good times lenders might underestimate the risk,
and overestimate it in bad times, thereby the procyclical credit issuance emerges. The other
ways how uncertainty could bring about amplification within the asymmetric information
setup and contribute to capital markets’ procyclicality are assuming non-linear preferences
of financial intermediaries, their time-varying risk-aversion or institutional constraints (for
example, capital requirements) that they have to abide by.
Second, uncertainty might emerge endogenously under financial frictions. For example,
relationship banking, that is found to be especially relevant for business lending15, works
to reduce informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. In bad times, when
banking activity slows down, the relationship banking is also affected negatively, what re-
duces the flow of information and thereby raises uncertainty, in this case microeconomic
uncertainty, about financial conditions of borrowers.
Empirical evidence provided by Alessandri and Bottero (2016) demonstrates the rele-
vance of the supply-side effects of uncertainty. This study shows that the reduction of credit
volumes in times of elevated uncertainty is not a mere by-product of the choices of borrow-
ers; also lenders contribute to this reduction by being more hesitant about credit issuance
and by tightening their lending standards, when uncertainty is high. Alessandri and Bottero
(ibid.) also stress the importance of banks’ balance sheets structure, as the decisions about
business loans’ issuance made by low capitalized banks are affected by elevated uncertainty
more than the same type of decisions of well-capitalized banks. Finally, Aastveit et al. (2013)
and Alessandri and Bottero (ibid.) find that uncertainty weakens the bank lending channel
of monetary policy, as banks become less responsive to fluctuations in short-term interest
rates facing elevated uncertainty. This multiple aforementioned considerations and liter-
ature findings corroborate the relevance of interactions between uncertainty and financial
frictions as a topic of study.
Given this, the objective of this dissertation is to study the macroeconomic effects of un-
certainty under financial frictions. Its contribution is the analysis of the portfolio reallocation
effects of economic uncertainty in the banking sector and examination of the effect of finan-
cial frictions on robustness of monetary policy in the case of model uncertainty.
15Hoshi et al. (1991), Petersen (1999), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Chakraborty and Charles (2006) and Bharath
et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence on that.
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The main hypothesis of this thesis is that uncertainty has a non-trivial effect on the work-
ings of economic mechanisms involving financial factors. The first part of the dissertation
deals with the effects of uncertainty shocks on loan issuance by the banking sector. The sec-
ond part is devoted to study the role that uncertainty about what type of financial frictions
is at work has on robust way to implement monetary policy.
In the first part of the thesis I study financial frictions stemming from the banking sector
activities. Bank credit is a critical factor of facilitating economic activities and promoting
economic growth. Not only banks act as financial intermediaries, reallocating resources and
facilitating transactions in economy, they also create additional means of payment in the
form of deposits, when originating new loans, what increases the aggregate nominal pur-
chasing power of the economy. In data bank supply of loans is shown to have a significant
effect over the business cycles in the United States, the Euro area and the UK16. As suggested
by the recent empirical findings, banks continue to play their special role in affecting ag-
gregate activity in the presence of other sources of funding, namely, equity, debt securities
and loans from non-banks that have a potential to compensate for the reductions of loan
supply. Aldasoro and Unger (2017) show that even though there has been a shift from bank
loan supply to other sources of funding from the onset of financial crisis of 2007-2009, the
lack of bank loans issuance was a crucial factor that depressed economic activity and prices.
Interestingly, negative shocks to the supply of alternative sources of business funding are
not found to have a significant effect on aggregate activity in this study. The special role
of banks as financial intermediaries is further reinforced by other considerations, including
their ability to reduce information asymmetries, delegated monitoring, liquidity insurance
and transformation, maturity transformation and relationship lending17.
Hence, part 1 of this thesis studies the effects of uncertainty shocks on asset portfolio
allocation by banks. Chapter 1 studies the impact of various factors on the issuance of the
different types of bank loans - commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans and real es-
tate loans. Two structural breaks are identified in relationships between credit and macroeco-
nomic variables over the sample of data studied - one is associated with the shift of monetary
policy in the US to an anti-inflation stance in early 1980’s, while the other one is related to the
2007-2009 financial crisis. The estimated set of orthogonalized structural vector autoregres-
sive models takes into account these structural breaks. I include bank capital, credit risk, and
uncertainty factors into the models in addition to controlling for macroeconomic variables
and indebtedness of the private sector. I employ several measures of economic uncertainty
to obtain robust evidence regarding the effects of uncertainty shocks. I use impulse response
functions and forecast error variance decomposition to make inference about the impact and
relative importance of various factors on the volume of issued bank loans and safe assets’
holdings, where the latter is measured by the sum of cash and Treasury and agency securi-
ties.
16See, for example, Busch, Scharnagl, and Scheithauer (2010); Cappiello, Kadareja, Kok, and Protopapa (2010);
de Bondt, Maddaloni, Peydro, and Scopel (2010); Hristov, Hulsewig, and Wollmershauser (2012); Moccero, Dar-
racq Paries, and Maurin, (2014); Altavilla, Darracq Paries, and Nicoletti (2015); Gambetti and Musso (2016).
17See Freixas and Rochet (2008) for details.
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The positive contribution of chapter 1 is to show that the volume of business loans is-
sued by commercial banks is driven by substantially different set of factors than the volume
of consumer loans or mortgages. In particular, in contrast to consumer loans, where the dy-
namics is determined predominantly by macroeconomic variables’ innovations, the issuance
of commercial and industrial loans is driven by shocks to uncertainty and credit risk. The
volume of real estate loans issued is determined by innovations to uncertainty and capital
ratio of banks in the short term, and by innovations to inflation, leverage of the private sector
and nominal interest rate in the medium and long terms. I resolve the puzzle raised by den
Haan et al. (2007) that business loans increase following monetary tightening. I find that
controlling for risk and uncertainty factors reveals the negative impact of monetary contrac-
tion on business loans issuance, what corroborates the existence of the bank lending channel
of monetary policy.
Chapter 2 analyzes the relationships between bank portfolio allocation and economic
uncertainty in a theoretical model. I set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with financial accelerator mechanism incorporated along the lines of Bernanke et al. (1999)
to analyse the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks on business loan volumes issued by
the portfolio-optimizing banking sector. Uncertainty is measured by the time-varying vari-
ance of idiosyncratic component of entrepreneurial productivity. I set up the structure of the
optimal debt contract to ensure that the lending rate is non-contingent on shock values, such
that the resulting profit of banks arises is not necessarily zero. Precautionary behaviour of
banks that emerges due to their willingness to self-insure against future profitability reduc-
tions allows to explain an additional share of increase of lending rates and of credit issuance
reduction in response to a positive uncertainty shock. Financial accelerator mechanism am-
plifies the portfolio reallocation effect of uncertainty shock, as increased external finance
premium reduces entrepreneurial demand for capital, putting downward pressure on real
price of capital and on borrowers’ net worth, what depresses the demand for capital further.
Chapter 3 studies how financial frictions affect robustness of monetary policy in DSGE
models in the case of model uncertainty. The types of frictions I consider are financial acceler-
ator and housing and collateral constraints. Modeling monetary policy in terms of optimized
interest rate rules, I find that welfare-maximizing policies for the models with financial fric-
tions are robust to model uncertainty. Policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian model
is not robust. The normative contribution of this chapter is to show that when there is un-
certainty about what type of frictions is at work, a policymaker exposes economy to risks of
significant welfare losses by using a reference model without frictions as economy represen-
tation. Hence, it is important to take into account financial frictions in the monetary policy
analysis in case of model uncertainty. Using fault tolerance approach I find that a modified
policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian model becomes robust, if it is modified to
incorporate the responses of interest rate to fluctuations in output.
I use different research approaches in this thesis. In chapter 1 a set of structural vec-
tor autoregression models is estimated on uncertainty, macro and financial data. In chapter
2 I use recursive macroeconomic method and focus on how banks can achieve optimality,
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when credit issuance is subject to asymmetric information, is risky and is made under uncer-
tainty. I solve the general equilibrium model up to the third-order by using the perturbation
method and compute impulse response functions as deviations from ergodic means of vari-
ables’ distributions. I use pruning procedure to deal with the problem of explosive behaviour
of simulated data in high-order perturbations. In chapter 3 I employ welfare-maximization
techniques to evaluate welfare costs and find optimized policy rules for the set of New Key-
nesian models; I also use the fault tolerance approach to draw normative conclusions about
the design of monetary policy rules adopted in the models of New Keynesian framework.
Selected literature review
In this section I first review the literature on various transmission mechanisms of uncer-
tainty. Then I discuss research that investigates the impact of uncertainty under financial
frictions.
Theoretical literature suggests several transmission mechanisms via which uncertainty
makes its impact on economic activity18. First, these are Oi-Hartman-Abel effects of uncer-
tainty on firms’ investments (Oi, 1961; Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983). Under flexible prices
setup, if the expected marginal revenue product of capital is convex in output prices and
in total factor productivity, greater uncertainty about output and TFP raises the demand for
capital. Hereby a positive effect of uncertainty shocks on investment arises. In case of sticky
prices, when all the demand has to be met and prices are not adjusted perfectly, an inverse ef-
fect emerges. Marginal profit is convex in relative prices, and therefore, setting the price too
high relative to the aggregate price implies selling lower quantity at a higher profit per unit.
Because setting too low price entails selling more goods, but at a higher loss, firms choose to
set higher prices. In the case of elevated uncertainty this increases markups over marginal
costs, what puts a downward pressure on demand and output19. According to Bloom (2014),
this transmission channel of uncertainty shocks works, when firms are able to expand and
contract easily in response to news, with the effect being stronger in medium and long run,
than in the short run. In the theoretical model in chapter 2 the capital is predetermined and
labour input can be adjusted, what allows elevated uncertainty to have positive effects on
investments according to Oi-Hartman-Abel transmission mechanism.
Second, there are real option effects of uncertainty, which arise due to partial irreversibil-
ity of investments (Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). It is argued that invest-
ment opportunities could be regarded as options. Higher uncertainty about returns of invest-
ments raises the option value of delay, i.e. a firm prefers to wait before hiring and making
investments in order to avoid a costly mistake. As a result, in presence of adjustment costs
that make reverse of investment and hiring expensive, firms become cautious and find it
optimal to wait, when uncertainty is high.
In a similar fashion, elevated uncertainty might cause households to delay their con-
sumption of durable goods. The option value of waiting is high in the case of heightened
uncertainty about future income. Eberly (1994) demonstrates that households postpone their
18See Bloom (2014) and Born and Pfeifer (2014) for details.
19See Pfeifer et al. (2012) for the discussion of Oi-Hartman-Abel effects in the open economy setup.
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decisions about buying housing, cars and other types of durable goods easily. That height-
ened uncertainty makes expenditure on households’ durables less responsive to changes in
demand and prices, has been shown in Foote et al. (2000) and Bertola et al. (2005).
Apart from the direct negative impact of uncertainty on investments, hiring and con-
sumption according to the real option transmission mechanism, wait-and-see mechanism of
uncertainty implies, that in making their decisions households and firms become less sensi-
tive to changes in business conditions. Bloom (2014) argues that this makes countercyclical
economic policy less effective and suggests that stimulus needs to be more aggressive in or-
der for policy actions to stabilize economy to be efficient. Born and Pfeifer (2013), on the
other hand, show that the role of policy uncertainty in driving business cycle fluctuations is
small.
In the theoretical model that I build in chapter 2 I introduce quadratic type of adjustment
costs, i.e. the costs that increase in the squared rate of investment. This allows me to ’switch
off’ the real option transmission mechanism of uncertainty in its impact on investment, be-
cause this type of effect is not generated under this type of smooth “convex” adjustment costs
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996). Additionally, I assume constant returns to
scale technology, what implies that choice of investment today has no impact on returns of
investments tomorrow, what also closes the option value channel. This allows me to focus
on analyzing the effects of the precautionary mechanism of banks as the main amplification
mechanism in the theoretical model.
The third channel via which uncertainty makes its impact on economic activity, is risk
aversion and risk premia effects; this channel encloses four sub-channels. First, in presence
of financial constraints elevated uncertainty increases firms’ borrowing costs, what reduces
growth (Arellano et al., 2010; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2011). This happens
due to investors requiring a higher risk premia that emerges because uncertainty increases
the probability of default. Second, risk premia transmission mechanism arises, if the be-
haviour of economic agents features “ambiguity aversion” (Hansen et al., 1999; Ilut and
Schneider, 2011). When agents have pessimistic beliefs, they act as if the worst scenario will
unfold. As increased uncertainty deteriorates the worst possible outcome, agents reduce
their investment expenditures and hiring. In contrast to this, a positive impact of increased
uncertainty is found, if the beliefs of economic agents are optimistic (Malmendier and Tate,
2005). Third, income uncertainty reduces consumption due to precautionary saving effect,
as argued by Bansal and Yaron (2004). The strength of this effect is ambiguous in the long
run, given that higher saving might contribute to increase of investment. As argued by
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), in case of open economies the effect of this channel on
domestic economy growth is negative, as increased consumers’ savings flow to foreign econ-
omy. In closed economies the negative effect of uncertainty via this transmission channel is
reached by allowing for nominal rigidities. Leduc and Liu (2012), Basu and Bundick (2011)
and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) show that if prices cannot be adjusted downwards
to clear the markets, elevated uncertainty leads to economic decline even in case of closed
economy. Forth, the importance of precautionary mechanism is shown, when there is lack
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of diversification of the companies’ chief executive manages, i.e. when their personal assets
and human capital are tied in one company. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) demonstrate
that CEOs are more cautious in making decisions about investment in this case, behaving
like risk-averse agents.
The transmission channel suggested in the theoretical model in chapter 2 of the thesis –
precautionary mechanism of financial intermediaries in response to elevated uncertainty -
has to do with the risk aversion and risk premia type of impact of uncertainty. Specifically,
this mechanism works via raising the cost of external finance, which is reinforced by the mo-
tive of the banking sector to self-insure against future profitability reduction due to increased
uncertainty.
While all the aforementioned effects of uncertainty are shown to produce significant con-
tractionary effects in partial equilibrium, their impact in general equilibrium is less strong.
This happens due to the fact that in general equilibrium prices and interest rates adjust, what
reduces the impact of the transmission mechanisms. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) demon-
strate that the importance of uncertainty shocks increases by 50%, when the general equilib-
rium channel is closed. Basu and Bundick (2012), on the other hand, find that in presence of
nominal rigidities and zero lower bound constraining the central bank, the effects of uncer-
tainty shocks in general equilibrium are significant.
Even though the topic of relationship between uncertainty and economic activity is cen-
tral in the current research agenda, the impact of uncertainty under financial frictions has
been analyzed within a limited number of studies so far. Most of the papers focus on fric-
tions characterizing the demand side of the financial sector. Among those, Gilchrist et al.
(2014) show the difference in implications of an increase in uncertainty for equity holders
and for bond holders in both empirical and theoretical settings. Using the debt contract
structure similar to Cooley and Quadrini (2001), they demonstrate that elevated idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty induces increasing cost of capital, what puts upward pressure on the costs
of bond holders, whereas the impact on the costs of equity holders is negative. Additional
TFP reduction in response to uncertainty shock is brought about by low credit supply, what
hinders efficient capital reallocation. Christiano et al. (2014) analyse the role of idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty, in their terminology - risk shocks, in an estimated DSGE model featuring
financial accelerator a la Bernanke et al. (1999). They demonstrate that increased uncer-
tainty makes a crucial contribution to the business cycles fluctuations in the US. In contrast
with two previous studies, Balke et al. (2013) analyse the effects of both micro- and macroe-
conomic uncertainty shocks in presence of credit frictions utilizing theoretical model with
agency costs. This study shows that when prices are sticky, positive shocks to uncertainty
induce the decline of economic activity, which is amplified by financial accelerator mecha-
nism. Similarly, Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2014) examine the impact of two
types of uncertainty: micro- and macrouncertainty. This study uses a financial accelera-
tor framework as formulated by Faia and Monacelli (2007) and demonstrates that nominal
rigidities and financial accelerator amplify the negative effect of elevated uncertainty on eco-
nomic activity.
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There is relatively little research of the effects of uncertainty stemming from the supply
side of the financial sector. Among these papers, Bonciani and van Roye (2016) focus on the
stickiness in banking retail interest rate as an amplification channel in analyzing the effects
of uncertainty shocks. Benes and Kumhof (2015) analyse welfare implications of imposing
the bank capital adequacy regulations under heightened uncertainty. Theoretical model in
chapter 2 of the thesis also focuses on the impact of uncertainty via the supply side of the
banking activity with the focus on the banks’ portfolio reallocation between risky and safe
assets. I emphasize the role of the banks’ precautionary mechanism, which has not been
examined so far. In doing this, my analysis is complementary to the studies discussed above.
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Chapter 1




In the course and in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis monetary authorities in many
countries have been trying to promote credit growth by adopting various policies, including
lowering nominal interest rates. According to the bank lending channel of monetary trans-
mission mechanism, banks are expected to increase loans issuance when the policy stance
is easy. This, however, did not happen. Despite the measures undertaken, credit growth in
many advanced economies has been predominantly negative for a prolonged period1. In
this context a finding by den Haan et al. (2007), that commercial and industrial (C&I) loans
respond to monetary easing by significant decline, has a special relevance, as it allows to
explain (at least, partially) weak or negative credit growth in the conditions of highly ac-
commodative stance of monetary policy. This finding, however, is not in line with the bank
lending channel of monetary transmission that has been established as relevant by many
works in macro-finance empirical literature2.
In this chapter I aim at resolving the puzzle of den Haan et al. (2007) by taking into ac-
count various risk and balance sheet factors that are found to be influential in credit market3.
I conjecture that controlling for economic uncertainty, credit risk, indebtedness of the corpo-
rate sector and banks’ capital ratio allows to explain the responses of disaggregated loans to
monetary policy shocks by avoiding omitted variables bias and to provide a valuable insight
to the portfolio behavior of bank loans following various types of shocks.
First, I introduce a baseline vector autoregression (VAR) model4 that builds upon den
Haan et al. (2007). A VAR process for commercial and industrial loans in this specification
1For details see IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013.
2See, among others, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Kishan and Opiela (2000).
3See, among others, Stock and Watson (2012), Banerjee et al. (2015).
4I refer to this specification of the model as a baseline model later.
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includes three major monetary policy VAR variables - real GDP, inflation and a monetary
policy instrument, - and a bank loan measure. In addition to commercial and industrial
loans, I analyze dynamic patterns of real estate loans and consumer loans within this bench-
mark setup. My specification, however, is different from the one in den Haan et al. (ibid.)
in several aspects. First, by using several types of Chow tests I formally test the VARs for
structural changes in relationships beween credit and macroeconomic variables. I identify
two structural breaks in the model’s parameters: the first one is related to the shift of the
US monetary policy to an anti-inflation stance in 1980-1982, and the second one is associated
with the financial crisis of 2007-2009. I therefore analyze the dynamic properties of loans
over three periods that are separated by the breakpoint dates5. Second, I perform robustness
checks of monetary policy shock effects by using alternative monetary policy indicators, in
particular, nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions and 3 month Treasury bill rate.
Third, I analyze the responses of banks’ Treasury and agency securities’ holdings and total
loans to monetary and real activity shocks. Forth, I analyze the dynamic patterns of loans
and securities’ holdings after the financial crisis of 2007-2009 by making use of monthly data
on macroeconomic and financial variables. I find that in the baseline model specification
business loans feature positive response to monetary tightening (the result obtained by den
Haan et al. (ibid.)) only over the period of 1983-2007; over 1954-1979 and over 2010-2015 all
types of loans respond to monetary contraction negatively.
I then augment the model with a set of risk and balance sheet variables that are found
to make substantial impact on banks’ decisions about loans’ issuance. I find that controlling
for economic uncertainty, credit risk, indebtedness of the corporate sector and capital ratio
of banks allows to resolve the puzzle raised by den Haan et al. (2007). In particular, com-
mercial and industrial loans show significant decline following monetary contraction when
risk and balance sheet factors are accounted for, what is consistent with the predictions of
the bank lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism. Robustness checks con-
firm that this result holds for various proxies of uncertainty – volatility measures (VIX/VXO
index that captures the stock market option-based implied volatility, conditional and uncon-
ditional heteroskedasticities of GDP growth) and those that aim to measure uncertainty as
vagueness (news-based uncertainty index and composite index of economic policy uncer-
tainty). Hence, I conclude that banks play the role in the monetary transmission mechanism
in line with the bank lending channel; the supply of business loans goes down after mone-
tary tightening in addition to reduction of the supply of consumer loans and mortgages.
Next, I demonstrate that analyzing the dynamic properties of disaggregated loans gains
valuable insights into the portfolio behaviour of banks. This is due to the fact that, as I show,
micro components of total loans have different laws of motion. Hence, examination of dis-
aggregated loans is beneficial comparing to the analysis of exclusively total loans’ dynamics,
first, for better understanding the workings of monetary transmission mechanism, and sec-
ond, for understanding the regularities of various classes of loans’ issuance. I show that
5The periods I look at are 1954Q4-1979Q4 (before the turn of the US monetary policy to an anti-inflation
stance in 1980-1982), 1983Q1-2007Q4 (before the financial crisis of 2007-2009) and over 2010Q2-2015Q4 (after the
financial crisis).
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responses of different types of loans to macroeconomic, risk and balance sheet shocks are
heterogeneous. First, uncertainty shock has a negative impact on issuance of mortgages and
business loans, while the effect on the volume of consumer loans issued is of the opposite
sign – they go up on the impact of uncertainty shock. Second, a positive innovation to the
corporate sector indebtedness reduces the issuance of business and real estate loans, while
the issuance of consumer loans increases. Third, issuance of business loans and consumer
loans goes down following a positive innovation to credit risk, while issuance of mortgages
does not react to it significantly. Forth, a balance sheet shock, i.e. a positive innovation to
banks’ capital ratio, has a positive impact on business loans and consumer loans, whereas
real estate loans decrease.
Forecast error variance decomposition suggests that distinct factors contribute to explain-
ing the variance of different classes of loans: while changes in variance of commercial and
industrial loans’ are largely explained by changes in credit risk, variance of mortgages’ vol-
umes is mainly driven by uncertainty and balance sheet shocks; finally, consumer loans vari-
ance is explained by innovations to real activity and inflation. Uncertainty shock is the main
driver of the safe assets’ movements as suggested by the results of forecast error variance
decomposition analysis.
Finally, I obtain evidence on substitution between different types of assets in banks’ port-
folios. First, banks reallocate their portfolios by reducing business loans issuance and in-
creasing cash and securities holdings responding to uncertainty and credit risk shocks. This
result pertains to business loans and safe assets as measured by their respective volumes and
by shares of asset portfolio. Importantly, the robustness to distinct uncertainty measures is
checked. I consider measures of macroeconomic uncertainty - news-based uncertainty in-
dex, composite policy uncertainty index, forecasters’ disagreement about future inflation,
VIX/VXO index and conditional and unconditional heteroscedasticity of GDP growth, to-
gether with the measures of microeconomic uncertainty - cross-sectional standard deviation
of firms’ pretax profit growth and cross-sectional spread of stock returns. This obtained
evidence of asset portfolio reallocation from business loans to safe assets is in line with pre-
dictions of portfolio theory that states that higher riskiness of loans results in decreasing
proportion of loans in portfolios. Second, I obtain the result that a positive shock to real ac-
tivity induces banks to reallocate assets from cash and securities into credit. Third, a positive
innovation to the indebtedness of the corporate sector entails decreasing issuance of business
loans and mortgages and increasing lending to households.
My work is related to several strands of literature. First, this is the literature that inves-
tigates the empirical relevance of the bank lending channel of monetary policy, particularly,
the effect of monetary policy shocks on bank lending volumes. Bernanke and Blinder (1992)
demonstrate that the fall in banks’ assets following monetary contraction is first concentrated
almost entirely in securities; total loans feature a brief positive response in the beginning and
then go down persistently. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and den Haan et al. (2007) look at
disaggregated loans in the VAR setup and find that while real estate and consumer loans
decline substantially after monetary tightening, business loans respond to an innovation to
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the federal funds rate positively. To support the existence and the importance of the bank
lending channel, Kashyap and Stein (1995) show the contrast in dynamics of loans issued
by small and large banks; they demonstrate that large banks increase total and C&I loans
after monetary contraction in two out of four of their model specifications, however, this
result is statistically insignificant. Ben Mohamed (2015) uses data from the Senior Loan Of-
ficer Opinion Survey to separate out the impact of monetary easing on credit demand and
credit supply, while the volume of loans issued is not taken into account, and finds that the
impact of monetary easing is on business loans issuance is positive. My work differs from
these studies, first, by establishing and taking into account the dates of structural changes in
relationship between loans and their potential determinants; second, I control for risk and
balance sheet factors in the models, whereas aforementioned works only take into account
standard monetary model variables: a real activity measure, inflation and a monetary pol-
icy measure. Thereby the critical difference between the results of the previously mentioned
studies and the results obtained in this chapter emerges.
Second, our paper is related to empirical literature that aims at detecting the factors fun-
damental for bank loans issuance. Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Van den Heuvel (2002)
show that low capital levels restrain lending after monetary policy tightening. Contrary to
this, Berrospide and Edge (2010) find only small effects of bank capital on lending. That
banks reduce volumes of lending primarily when they face liquidity constraints is shown
by Kashyap and Stein (1995) for the US, and by Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003) for
the European economies. Lown and Morgan (2006) emphasize that credit standards are cru-
cial in explaining the dynamics of business loans. Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011)
demonstrate that banks’ stability, in particular, banks’ capital, their dependence on market
funding and on non-interest sources of income play an important role as a factor of bank
lending both in Europe and in the US. A growing stream of literature analyzes the effects
of uncertainty on credit market developments. Stock and Watson (2012) show that shocks
associated with uncertainty and financial disruptions are critical, in particular, because their
influence has brought about the recession of 2007-2009. Balke and Zeng (2013) and Caldara
et al. (2013) argue in favour of output and uncertainty shocks as the main drivers of finan-
cial intermediation activity. Baum et al. (2009) and Quagliariello (2008) demonstrate that
macroeconomic uncertainty is a significant determinant of banks’ investment decisions by
presenting evidence of negative association between macroeconomic uncertainty and cross-
sectional variability of banks’ total loan-to-asset ratios. To the best of our knowledge, the
impact of uncertainty shock on different loan components has not been studied before; this
is how our work adds to existing literature.
Third, my work is related to the literature on bank risk management and portfolio alloca-
tion. Salas and Saurina (2002) demonstrate that during economic booms banks expand their
lending activity and relax their selection criteria, such that in the following downturns bad
loans increase, producing losses. Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) use theoretical
analysis to demonstrate that active risk management allows banks to hold less capital and to
invest more aggressively in risky and illiquid loans. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) confirm
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this empirically with respect to credit risk management, while Brewer at al. (2000) suggest
evidence that active management of market risk influences bank performance and risk. I
demonstrate that there is portfolio reallocation not only between risky loans and safe assets,
but also between different classes of loans in response to macroeconomic, risk and balance
sheet shocks.
1.2 Empirical approach
Aiming at establishing the important determinants of loan components’ dynamics and at
resolving the puzzle raised by den Haan et al. (2007), I start the analysis with the structural
vector autoregression model as specified by den Haan et al. (ibid.), who examine the port-
folio behaviour of bank loans following monetary and non-monetary shocks. The baseline
VAR models include one of loans components or safe assets in addition to the federal funds
rate, a price index and a real activity measure. On the next step, I extend a set of model’s
variables to verify, whether there is an additional information content in the other factors’
variation for explaining various loans’ and safe assets’ dynamics. In particular, I control
for corporate leverage, charge-off rate, capital ratio and uncertainty in the extended model
setup.
1.2.1 Data
The dataset includes US quarterly data from 1954Q4 to 2015Q4. To estimate the models over
the period after the 2007-2009 financial crisis break point, I use monthly data spanning from
2010M4 to 2015M12. The details of definitions, treatment and sources of the data are reported
in the Appendix. Most of the data series are taken from the St Louis Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data and the Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Data Download
Program. All the monetary values are real and deflated with a GDP implicit price deflator.
All the series are seasonally adjusted: they either come as seasonally adjusted by the source
agency or are adjusted with the X-13ARIMA-SEATS algorithm. Additionally, the variables’
values are taken in logs (with the exception of interest rates). Figure 1.1 in Appendix shows
the levels data for the variables.
We use bank loan series from the H.8 releases (Asset and Liabilities of Commercial Banks
in the United States) by the Federal Reserve. I analyze data on banks’ commercial and in-
dustrial loans6, real estate loans, consumer loans7 and safe assets. Safe assets include cash
and Treasury and agency securities, i.e. assets with low/minimal level of risk. These four
types of assets comprise 66-79% of commercial banks’ total assets depending on the period8.
6I use “commercial and industrial loans” and “business loans” interchangeably.
7There is an upward spike in the volume of all types of loans (especially, in consumer loans) in the beginning
of 2010 due to a new reporting requirement issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. To avoid
including this spike into the model, I estimate the model after the financial crisis period on the sample that starts
in 2010Q2 (or 2010M4).
8The types of bank assets, which are not analyzed here, are interbank loans, loans to commercial banks,
trading assets, other securities, other loans and leases and other assets.
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The percentages of each class of asset in total portfolio are reported in Table 1.4 in Appendix.
Figure 1.3 displays their dynamics.
Federal funds rate is taken as a benchmark measure of monetary policy, given that it
records shocks to supply of bank reserves and is a good indicator of monetary policy ac-
tions9. I employ three-month rate on Treasury bills and nonborrowed reserves of depository
institutions as alternative monetary policy measures for robustness check of monetary policy
effects10.
Leverage is a measure of the corporate sector indebtedness, which could potentially be
an important determinant of business loans’ issuance. Recent evidence shows that leverage
is a key factor shaping financial vulnerability11, that’s why I look at it as at a measure of
ex-ante riskiness of non-financial corporates. Credit risk of a particular class of bank loans,
i.e. ex-post riskiness of loans, is measured by a charge-off rate on loans.
1.2.2 Uncertainty measures
I use two types of uncertainty measures for the purposes of the current analysis: measures
of macroeconomic and microeconomic uncertainty. Two groups of proxies are employed to
measure macroeconomic uncertainty: volatility measures and measures that capture uncer-
tainty as ”vagueness”. Among the former, the first one is a realized unconditional volatility












where gi is an annualized quarter-to-quarter growth rate of real GDP.
Second, I use conditional volatility of GDP growth to measure uncertainty. I estimate
heteroscedasticity of real GDP growth with GARCH (1,1)13. In particular, the volatility is
estimated as a conditional variance from GARCH model. The mean equation of GARCH
specification is:
gt = c+ θgt−1 + εt, (1.2)
where c and θ are parameters, and εt is a heteroscedastic error term. The conditional variance
equation is:





where the conditional variance σ2t is specified using parameters ω, α and β, news about
9I go along McCallum (1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Sims (1992) in
that.
10Eichenbaum (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) argue that innovations to nonborrowed reserves
primarily reflect exogenous shocks to monetary policy, while innovations to broader monetary aggregates pri-
marily reflect shocks to money demand.
11See, for example, Shularick and Taylor (2012) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012).
12Unconditional volatility of GDP growth is used a macroeconomic uncertainty measure, for example, in Fogli
and Perri (2015) and in Basu and Bundick (2015).
13A similar measure of macroeconomic uncertainty was constructed in Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo
(2014) on TFP data.
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volatility from the pervious period ε2t−1 and last period’s forecast variance σ
2
t−1. The results
of GARCH (1,1) model estimation are given in Table 1.7.
The last measure of uncertainty as volatility used here is VXO index, a stock market
option-based implied volatility proxy, which measures anticipated volatility of the Standard
& Poor’s 100 index. Instead of using data on conventional VIX index, which measures ex-
pected volatility of the S&P 500 index, I use data on VXO index, because data for the latter
index is available for the longer time period - starting from 1986, - comparing to data avail-
able for VIX index - starting from 199014. Both VIX and VXO indices are used as measures
of short-term macroeconomic uncertainty, as they represent the expectations of the market
about its volatility in the next 30 days. VIX has been previously used as a proxy for uncer-
tainty at the firm level, for instance, in Leahy and Whited (1996) and in Bloom et al. (2007).
The second group of macroeconomic uncertainty measures are those that aim to capture
vagueness or ’unknownness’ of future economic outlook. I employ the news-based economic
uncertainty index, the composite index of economic policy uncertainty index, constructed
by Baker et al. (2016) and forecasters’ disagreement about future inflation. The forecasters’
disagreement about future inflation measures the dispersion between individual forecasters’
predictions about future levels of the Consumer Price Index and is used with data coming
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. News-
based uncertainty index quantifies newspaper coverage of economic uncertainty, related to
policy. In particular, it is the index of search results from 10 large newspapers, from which
a normalized index of the volume of news articles discussing economic policy uncertainty
is constructed15. The composite economic policy uncertainty index developed in Baker et
al. (2016) captures the compound effect on policy uncertainty of several factors, including,
first, the news-based uncertainty, second, uncertainty about the future path of the federal tax
code, and third, disagreement of professional forecasters about government spending and
inflation.
The measures of microeconomic uncertainty used in the current analysis are cross-sectional
standard deviation of firms’ profit growth and cross-firm stock return variation. The former
one measures the within-quarter cross-sectional spread of pretax profit growth rates nor-
malized by average sales. As suggested by Bloom (2009), profit growth has a close fit to
productivity and demand growth in homogenous revenue functions, and hence, its stan-
dard deviation across firms could be used as a pertinent proxy for idiosyncratic or microe-
conomic uncertainty. The latter microeconomic uncertainty measure, suggested in Bloom et
al. (2016), is an interquartile range of firms’ monthly stock returns. This uncertainty proxy
discloses how volatile are perceptions of the stock market participants about firms’ perfor-
mance. Campbell et al. (2001) demonstrate that in booms cross-sectional spread of stock
returns is about 50% lower than in recessions; Bloom et al. (2016) also show that this uncer-
tainty measure is countercyclical.
Table 1.1 shows that pairwise correlations between various uncertainty measures range
14See http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix-options-and-futures.aspx for details.
15See http://www.policyuncertainty.com for details.
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VXO 0.15* 0.41*** 1***
News-based
uncertainty index
0.40*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 1***
Policy uncertainty
index
0.63*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.88*** 1***
Forecasters’ disagreement 0.53*** 0.31** 0.24*** 0.14* 0.49*** 1***
Standard deviation
of firms’ profit growth
0.13 0.33** 0.41** 0.18** 0.09 -0.02 1***
Cross-firm stock
return variation
0.11 0.51*** 0.75*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.14* 0.29** 1***
Note. *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The following abbreviations are used: UV GDPs -
unconditional volatility of GDP growth, CV GDPg - conditional volatility of GDP growth,
VXO - VXO index, NB UI - News-based uncertainty index, P UI - Policy uncertainty index,
FD - forecasters’ disagreement about future inflation, SD pr g - standard devation of firms’
pretax profit growth, CF SRV - cross-firm stock return variation. The sample is
1954Q4-2015Q4 or the longest one over this period, for which the data is available.
from very low and insignificant (for example, between cross-firm stock return variation and
unconditional volatility of GDP growth) to high and significant (for example, between VXO
index and cross-firm stock return variation), Figure 1.2 plots series for the uncertainty mea-
sures discussed here. Composite policy uncertainty index and news-based uncertainty index
co-move together (correlation coefficient 0.88), because the latter one is one of the compo-
nents of the former. High correlation is also observed between conditional and uncondi-
tional volatility of GDP growth (0.75). Generally, microeconomic uncertainty measures tend
to be correlated with macroeconomic ones to the less extent than macroeconomic uncer-
tainty proxies between each other. In particular, this refers to standard deviation of pretax
profit growth that shows only week or moderate correlation with other uncertainty mea-
sures. Hence, there are significant differences between dynamic properties of distinct mea-
sures of uncertainty.
1.2.3 Empirical methodology
I follow a conventional procedure to study the impact of monetary policy and other non-
monetary factors on bank loan variables and estimate a structural vector autoregression
model. A model considered is:
Zt = B1Zt−1 + · · ·+ BqZt−q + ut, (1.4)
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where Zt is a k-dimensional vector of observable variables, ut is a k-dimensional vector of
reduced-form error terms, and consistent estimates of the coefficients Bi’s are obtained by






where St is a monetary policy instrument, the federal funds rate, or alternatively, the volume
of nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions, or a three-month rate on Treasury bills.
X1t is a (k1 × 1) vector with elements whose contemporaneous values are in the information
set of the central bank, such that St is affected by variables in X1t contemporaneously; X1t is
not influenced by St in period t. X2t is a (k2 × 1) vector with elements whose contempora-
neous values are not in the information set of the central bank, so St is not affected by their
influence, but it does exert an impact on them in period t. k = k1 + 1 + k2. Drawing from
Christiano et al. (1999), I assume that the relationship between the VAR disturbances and the
fundamental economic shocks, εt, is given by
ut = A˜εt. (1.5)
A˜ is a (k × k) matrix of coefficients, and εt is a (k × 1) vector of uncorrelated fundamental
shocks with a unit standard deviation each, so E[utu′t] = A˜A˜′. To determine the effects of
a monetary policy shock, a restriction, imposed on A˜, is that it is a block lower-triangular
matrix:
A˜ =
 A˜11 0k1×1 0k1×k2A˜21 A˜22 01×k2
A˜31 A˜32 A˜33
 ,
where A˜11 is a (k1 × k1) matrix, A˜21 is a (1× k1) matrix, A˜31 is a (k2 × k2) matrix, A˜22 is a
(1× 1) matrix, A˜32 is a (k2 × 1) matrix, A˜33 is a (k2 × k2) matrix, and 0i×j is a (i× j) matrix
with zero elements.
For the benchmark specification I assume that X2t is empty. In particular, the assump-
tion is that monetary authority observes and responds to contemporaneous information on
all other variables. I consider this is a plausible assumption given that data on price level,
industrial output, aggregate employment and other indicators of aggregate real economic
activity are available to the FED on monthly basis16. I find empirical support for this as-
sumption: a pairwise Granger causality test suggests that the direction of Granger-causation
runs from loans to funds rate and not the other way around (Table 1.6). In the New Keyne-
sian approach this assumption corresponds to the notion of a feedback interest rate rule of
16This assumption is made, among others, by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano et al. (1999),
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Strongin (1995), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1995), and
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
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monetary authority, which closes general equilibrium models. For robustness check I also
consider an alternative order: X1t is assumed to be empty. This alternative identification
scheme is adopted by den Haan et al. (2007), who assume that monetary authority does not
respond to contemporaneous information.
We place loan volumes on the last place in X1t block. The assumption is that banks
observe contemporaneous information on real activity and inflation when deciding on loans’
issuance. Cross-correlation coefficients between growth of loans and GDP growth, on one
side, and between growth of loan and inflation, on the other side, indicate that GDP and
inflation lead loan volumes. Granger causality tests show that past values of GDP help to
predict loans and not the other way around. This evidence justifies making the assumption of
bank loans being ordered after a real activity and inflation measures. I also try an alternative
order when loan volumes are placed after the federal funds rate, based on the assumption
that banks see the policy rate set by the central bank contemporaneously, in this case all the
variables are placed in block X2t, while X1t is empty.
Thus, the variables’ order in the baseline model is: a real activity, an inflation measure,
loan volumes or safe assets (added one at a time) and a monetary policy instrument. An
alternative order that I use for robustness check of monetary policy effects is: a monetary
policy instrument, a real activity measure, inflation proxy and a loan volumes or safe assets
component.
A wider set of variables is included in the extended model. In particular, measures of
uncertainty, capital ratio, charge-off rates and leverage of non-financial corporate sector are
used to assess whether there is an additional information content in fluctuations of these fac-
tors for explaining variations of bank loans and safe assets. This ordering is based on several
assumptions. First, it is assumed that uncertainty shocks influence all other variables con-
temporaneously, such that uncertainty is an underlying characteristic of the state of economy
being unaffected by other variables contemporaneously, i.e. within the same quarter17. This
consideration is corroborated by estimates of cross-correlation between uncertainty proxies
and business loans – the former leading the latter (Table 1.5), - and by Granger causality
tests, which show that when Granger causality effect is significant, the direction of this effect
goes from uncertainty to loans (Table 1.6)18. It is worth noticing that the strongest negative
correlation between uncertainty and business loans is found for the following uncertainty
proxies: VXO index, news-based uncertainty index and composite policy uncertainty index.
Granger causality tests confirm tight relation of loans to VXO index and news-based index,
for which the Granger causation effects are significant. I use news-based uncertainty as a
benchmark measure of economic uncertainty in our extended model. The results for em-
ploying alternative uncertainty measures are available in the Appendix.
Leverage of non-financial corporates is placed after the real activity and inflation mea-
17The same identification scheme is employed by Bachmann et al. (2012) and by Bonciani and van Roye (2016),
where the uncertainty measure is ordered first in the VAR.
18This holds for all uncertainty proxies except for conditional volatility of GDP growth, for which correlation
with loans is found to be nonsignificant and Granger causality effect doesn’t go in the direction from uncertainty
to loans.
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Table 1.2: VAR models under consideration.
Baseline model Extended model
Variables






Federal funds rate (or an
alternative policy measure)
For robustness check of monetary
policy effects




































Note. For the baseline model the last estimation period starts in 2010M4 and not earlier, be-
cause the data on loans has a break in March and April of 2010, when the new reporting re-
quirements issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board were introduced. Financial
Accounting Statements (FAS) 166 and 167 have implications for how banks treat off-balance-
sheet special purpose vehicles.
sures based on the assumption that companies observe contemporaneous values of uncer-
tainty, real activity and inflation, when making decision about how much debt to incur,
whereas all credit variables are not observed by them. Capital ratio of banks is placed before
loans. Capital adequacy requirements affect the amount of risky assets banks can have on
their balance sheets, and that is the reason why I assume that banks see and take into account
the level of their capital ratio when making decisions about risky loans’ issuance. Asset com-
ponent variable (safe assets or loans) is placed after the capital ratio. The assumption is that
banks observe contemporaneous information on uncertainty, real activity, inflation, indebt-
edness of corporates and capital ratio, when deciding on loans’ issuance and how much safe
assets to hold. Charge-off rate on loans is placed after loan volumes. It is assumed that the
value of loans removed from the books and charged against loss reserves is affected by the
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volume of loans issued by banks to firms contemporaneously. Thus, the variables’ order in
the extended model is: an uncertainty proxy, a real activity measure, an inflation measure,
leverage of the corporates, banks’ capital ratio, loan volumes or safe assets (added one at a
time), charge-off rate on a certain class of loans (or a charge-off rate on total loans in case of
a VAR with total loans or safe assets) and a monetary policy instrument.
Based on Akaike information criterion (AIC) and in line with Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn information criteria, the benchmark specification of the model includes two lags. The
lag orders of the extended model specifications are also based on AIC and are given in notes
to respective figures in Appendix.
1.3 Stability analysis
Empirical business cycles literature argues that there have been important changes in the
characteristics of dynamics of the series analyzed19: a shift of the US monetary policy to
an anti-inflation stance in 1980-1982 and the financial crisis of 2008-2009. I employ formal
structural stability tests to check our VAR models for the parameters’ stability at these two
possible break dates.
We use Chow tests to test the hypothesis of VAR models parameters’ constancy follow-
ing Canova (2007) and Lutkepohl (2005). The null hypothesis of time invariance of the pa-
rameters throughout the sample period is checked against the possibility of a change in the
parameter values at period TB. I consider three versions of Chow tests: break-point test,
sample-split test and Chow forecast test20. P-values are computed in two ways: first, treat-
ing the break date as unknown (this serves the purpose of detecting the date of structural
break), and second, treating the break date as determined exogenously (to confirm the break
existence, or as a robustness check of the result obtained at the first step). See section 1.6.2 in
Appendix for details of the approach used.
The Chow tests are designed to detect one potential structural break from the sample21.
Our sample period 1954-2015 includes two possible shifts, therefore, I apply the tests for two
adjacent time intervals separated by one potential break date and exclude the interval left.
Hence, testing for parameters stability during the US monetary policy shift, I exclude the
period from the onset of financial crisis from the test. The test sample in this case is 1954Q4
to 2007Q4. Testing the hypothesis of model’s parameters stability during the financial crisis
I exclude the period before 1980. The test sample in this case is 1983Q1 to 2015Q3. Results of
testing for structural breaks are given in Table 1.3.
All the versions of the Chow test statistics reject the null hypothesis of parameters stabil-
ity in the VAR models over the analyzed sample period. I conclude that there are structural
changes in the models’ parameters in 1980-1982 and in 2007-2009. Therefore, the first pe-
riod that I estimate our vector autoregressive models for is 1954Q1-1979Q4, the second one
19See Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Cogley and Sargent (2002), Primiceri (2006), Stock and Watson (2003) and
Koop et al. (2009), among others.
20See Lutkepohl et al. (2006), Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001) and Hendry and Doornik (1997) for details.
21See Canova (2007) and Lutkepohl (2001) for details on this.
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2008Q3 147.675*** 90.707*** 1.749***
Notes. The main entries are tests statistics for Chow tests to check the null hypothesis that
the set of VAR(2) model parameters is constant: for the US monetary policy shift - over the
period from 1954Q4 to 2007Q4, and for the financial crisis 2007-2009 – over the period from
1983Q1 to 2015Q3. *** p < 0.01. For robustness checks I perform the tests for VAR models
with different lag orders. These tests also reject the null hypothesis of the models’ parameters
stability.
- 1983Q1-2007Q4 and the third one - 2010M4-2015M12. Monthly data is used to analyze the
dynamics of loans after the financial crisis due to lack of quarterly observations. Given that
1980-1982 and 2007-2009 are the periods of extreme volatility associated with unprecedented
monetary policy measures (monetary base control), I exclude them from the study, due to
their dynamic characteristics being not indicative for the rest of the sample. I start the third
sample in 2010M4 and not earlier, because the data on loans has a break in March and April
of 2010, when the new reporting requirement issued by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board were introduced22.
1.4 Estimation results and robustness
1.4.1 Baseline model
I begin by analyzing the results of the baseline model. It includes a real activity measure, a
measure of inflation, loan component (one of the loan classes or safe assets included in the
VAR one at a time) and the federal funds rate. Though my VAR specification draws from den
Haan et al. (2007), there are some differences with their analysis. First, I estimate the model
over several periods taking into account structural breaks dates; second, I increase the size
22Financial Accounting Statements (FAS) 166 and 167 have implications for how banks treat off-balance-sheet
special purpose vehicles.
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of the sample23; third, I perform robustness check of monetary policy shock effects by using
alternative policy indicators; and forth, I analyze responses of safe assets and total loans to
monetary and real activity shocks, what is not done in den Haan et al. I analyze the results in
form of impulse responses and forecast error variance decomposition of disaggregated and
total loans and safe assets. 90% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as
in Kilian (1998).
Figures 1.4-1.8 in the the chapter appendix plot the responses of business loans, real estate
loans, consumer loans24, total loans and Treasury and agency securities after one-standard
deviation shocks to the federal funds rate, real activity and inflation under the benchmark
specification of the VAR, i.e. when the federal funds rate is placed last in the VAR. Figures
1.9-1.13 in this chapter appendix plot impulse responses under the alternative specification
of the model, i.e. when the federal funds rate is placed first in the VAR. Figures 6-10 in
Appendix D25 plot impulse responses for the model with an alternative measure of monetary
policy – 3-month Treasury bill rate that is placed the last in the VAR according to our baseline
model specification. Finally, figures 11-15 in Appendix D plot impulse responses for the
model with an alternative measure of monetary policy – nonborrowed reserves of depository
institutions that are placed the last in the VAR26.
There are significant differences between responses of loans to shocks over different pe-
riods. I obtain that significant positive impact of monetary policy contraction on business
loans - the effect found in den Haan et al. (2007) - is characteristic for this class of loans
only for the period 1983Q1-2007Q4 (Figure 1B, the chapter appendix). Over the periods
1954Q4-1979Q4 and 2010M4-2015M12 a significant negative effect of monetary tightening
on business loans is observed (Figures 1A and 1C in the chapter appendix). The alternation
of negative and positive effects of monetary policy shocks from one time period to another
is obtained in the benchmark and alternative baseline model specifications (Figures 1.9, the
chapter appendix). Robustness checks show that when 3-month Treasury bill rate is used as
a monetary policy measure, business loans’ increase after monetary tightening significantly
(Figure 6B, Appendix D), whereas when nonborrowed reserves measure monetary policy
actions, this effect is positive but nonsignificant (Figure 11B, Appendix D).
The other classes of loans - real estate loans and consumer loans - decrease responding to
monetary contraction in all the time period subsamples, what is consistent to bank lending
channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism (Figures 1.2 and 1.3, the chapter ap-
pendix). I demonstrate that the size of these negative response gets smaller with time: over
23The sample in den Haan et al. (2007) spans from 1977Q1 to 2004Q2.
24Due to an upward spike in consumer loans in the beginning of 2010, because new reporting requirement
issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, were set in place, I estimate the VAR with the consumer
loans until 2009Q4.
25Appendix D contains the set of plots providing the complete results of robustness tests. I don’t include them
in the main body of thesis due to the large volume. Appendix D is available from the author upon request.
26I estimate the latter version of the model for all the sub-samples (1954Q4-1979Q4, 1983Q1-2007Q4, and
2010M4-2015M12), even though the values of nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions underwent sub-
stantial changes in 2008 that are not generally characteristic to the dynamics of this series (For more details,
see Statistical Releases from the Federal Reserve: http://www.federalreserve.gov/feeds/h3.html), because the
break date in 2008 is not included in any of the sub-sample periods.
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1954-1979 one standard deviation shock to monetary policy reduces mortgages by 1.65% and
consumer loans by 1.84%; over 1983-2007 – by 0.49% and 0.41%, over 2010-2015 – by 0.24%
and 0.06% respectively. These findings are robust to VAR specification and to the measure of
monetary policy used (Figures 2, 3, 7, 8, 12, 13, Appendix D). In addition to negative effects,
I find that consumer and real estate loans feature brief and mostly insignificant positive re-
sponses to monetary contraction (Figures 2B, 2C, 3B in the chapter appendix), which are also
present in den Haan et al. (2007).
Next, I observe that over 1983-2007 total loans go up following monetary contraction,
while in subsamples 1954-1979 and 2010-2015 they are reduced after a positive shock to the
federal funds rate. This dynamics reflects the patterns of loan components (Figures 4A, 4B,
4C in the chapter appendix), specifically, of business loans positive response to monetary
contraction. This finding, which is robust to specification of VAR and to the measure of the
monetary policy used, differs from the results shown in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and in
den Haan et al. (2005), where they document the estimated response for total loans as not
robust and not significant. However, this finding is in line with the results of Kashyap and
Stein (1995), who also demonstrate that total loans go up after monetary tightening in some
of their specifications. I conjecture that this difference emerges, because structural breaks are
not taken into account in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and in den Haan et al. (2005)27. As
a result, the negative effect of monetary tightening on total loans that I find for the period
before 1980’s gets mixed with the positive impact of total loans to contraction that I find for
the period after 1980’s, so that the resulting effect is not robust and insignificant. Still, I show
that this positive reaction of total loans dies out after 6 quarters from the shock impact, when
total loans go down following monetary tightening over all time period samples.
All classes of loans go up following a positive innovation to real economic activity, while
Treasury and agency securities holdings are reduced (Figures 5A, 5B, 5C, the chapter ap-
pendix). This reveals banks’ preference to substitute out safe assets with risky loans on
their balance sheets in the times of better economic conditions. Specifically, banks’ assets
portfolios are reallocated in response to a positive real activity shock in the way that makes
portfolios riskier. This finding is significant and valid for all the time period subsamples
analyzed.
We conjecture that puzzling positive response of commercial and industrial loans to mon-
etary contraction in 1983-2007 might be the case of omitted variable bias, i.e. inability of a
small monetary policy VAR to capture the critical forces that drive business loans volumes.
I extend the set of model’s variables to test this hypothesis.
1.4.2 Extended model
In this section I report the results of the extended model estimation over the period 1983-
2007, which is completed to improve understanding of the workings of monetary transmis-
sion mechanism on commercial and industrial loans. I aim to resolve the puzzling response
27The samples analyzed at in den Haan et al. (2005) are 1960-2003 for H8 data and 1977-2000 for Call Report
Data.
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of this class of loans to monetary contraction over 1983-2007 obtained with the baseline
model. I augment the model with a set of risk and balance sheet variables: macroeconomic
uncertainty, portfolio credit risk (measured by charge-off rate on respective class of loans),
leverage of corporates, and banks’ capital ratio, measured as a ratio of banks’ equity capital
to total assets. In the benchmark version of the extended model the news-based uncertainty
index is used as uncertainty measure. The results in form of impulse responses and fore-
cast error variance decomposition for extended model are given on Figures 1.14-1.20 and
Tables 1.8-1.12 in the the chapter appendix; the results of employing alternative uncertainty
measures are available on Figures 16-28 in Appendix D.
The counterintuitive positive response of commercial and industrial loans to monetary
tightening, observed in the case of the baseline model, is not present, when risk and balance
sheet factors are controlled for. Specifically, positive innovation to federal funds rate exerts
a significant negative effect on business loans in the extended model version (Figure 1.14A,
the chapter appendix). Robustness checks are performed with all the measures of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty discussed above, and they confirm this finding (Figures 16-18, Appendix
D). Real estate and consumer loans go down upon monetary contraction in the way they do
in the baseline model version (Figures 1.14A, 1.15A, Appendix C).
We therefore conjecture that the positive effect of monetary tightening on business loans
in the baseline model is the case of omitted variable bias, when the effects of important
loan volumes’ determinants are left out. All of the variables added to the extended model –
macroeconomic uncertainty, corporate leverage, portfolio credit risk and banks’ capital ratio
- are correlated with business loans volumes significantly and feature significant Granger
causality relationships with them (Tables 1.5 and 1.6 in the chapter appendix). Forecast error
variance decomposition analysis reveals that a shock to portfolio credit risk contributes up
to 24% of business loans’ variability, making it the most important determinant of business
loans’ volumes dynamics (Table 1.8 in the chapter appendix). I conclude that portfolio credit
risk is a critical factor that should be accounted by a model that aims at explaining loan vol-
umes’ movements. I conjecture that the baseline model features a counterintuitive positive
response of business loans to monetary policy shock due to the absence in the baseline model
of a credit risk variable, which is particularly influential for C&I loans. I obtain that mone-
tary tightening leads to significant increases in charge-off rate on C&I loans, macroeconomic
uncertainty also goes up (Figure 1.14B in the chapter appendix). Hence, higher level of credit
risk and uncertainty, together with a reduced GDP, put a downward pressure on business
loans issuance following monetary contraction.
Shocks to credit risk are also an important driver of consumer loans movements. Ad-
ditionally, real activity shocks and innovations to inflation help to explain variance of con-
sumer loans (Table 1.10 in the chapter appendix). In contrast to this, changes in issuance of
mortgages are not driven by credit risk shocks. Cost shocks, shocks to monetary policy and
to the leverage of the corporate sector contribute to explanation of the variance of real estate
loans (Table 1.9 in the chapter appendix). The finding that innovations to credit risk do not
explain movements of the real estate loans might contribute as an evidence to the discussion
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about the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis.
The effect of a positive innovation to charge-off rates on business and consumer loans
is significantly negative (Figures 1.14A and 1.17A in the chapter appendix), whereas safe
assets react to this shock positively (Figure 1.19A in the chapter appendix). Hence, banks
reallocate their portfolios following positive credit risk shocks by reducing loans issuance
and increasing their safe assets holdings28.
The dynamic patterns of loan components to macroeconomic uncertainty shock are also
heterogeneous. The impact of a positive innovation to uncertainty on business loans de-
pends on the nature of uncertainty measure employed. A positive shock to vagueness-type
measures of uncertainty, such as news-based uncertainty index or composite index of eco-
nomic policy uncertainty, makes a significantly negative effect on the issuance of commercial
and industrial loans (Figure 1.14A in the chapter appendix and Figure 16A, Appendix D). A
shock to macroeconomic uncertainty measured as volatility of GDP growth (conditional or
unconditional) also drives business loans down, but these negative impacts are statistically
insignificant (Figures 16C, 16D, Appendix D). The impact of positive innovation to the stock
market option-based implied volatility increases C&I loans insignificantly (Figure 16B, Ap-
pendix D). I therefore conclude that changes in innovations to volatility (of GDP growth or
stock market) don’t reduce business loans’ issuance as much as a spike of “unknownness”
of the future economic outlook does.
To find out what is the reason of this disparity in responses of business loans to different
types of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks, I estimate impulse responses of the variables to
innovations in uncertainty, using all the macroeconomic uncertainty proxies at hand. I ob-
tain that there is a significant difference in responses of the leverage of the corporate sector to
different types of uncertainty shocks, while all the other variables respond to distinct types of
uncertainty shocks in the same way (Figures 1.14C and 1.14D in the chapter appendix). The
critical disparity is that corporate sector responds to positive innovations to volatility by re-
ducing their leverage, while innovations to uncertainty defined as vagueness/unknownness
of economic outlook make firms increase their indebtedness. I conjecture that this happens,
because when economic perspectives are unclear, firms don’t necessarily relate the state of
unknownness to only worse economic conditions in future or threats, but also foresee oppor-
tunities. Then it is important for companies to secure funding, so that benefits of improved
economic conditions can be enjoyed. The fact that firms are more indebted puts downward
pressure on the supply of C&I loans (indebted borrowers are more financially vulnerable)
and on demand for C&I loans (indebted firms are less willing to ask for additional borrow-
ings). Hence the significant negative response of business loans to uncertainty shock, when
uncertainty is defined as vagueness/unknownness of economic outlook.
In contrast to this, an innovation to volatility measure of uncertainty leads to decrease of
the leverage of non-financial corporates. I admit that this effect is present due to firms aim-
ing at reduction of their debt in face of more volatile GDP growth and/or stock market. In
28Real estate loans feature a brief positive response to the credit risk shock (Figure 1.16A in the chapter ap-
pendix), but this result is not robust across alternative model specifications.
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case of high volatility the possibility of decreasing business returns is more evident than in
the case of vague economic perspectives. Relatively low level of leverage does not depress
supply and demand for loans in the contrast to the case of vagueness-type of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty measure. Hence, there’s no significant reduction of C&I loans following
innovation to volatility measure of uncertainty.
As an additional robustness check and to provide an empirical evidence for the theoret-
ical model constructed in the next chapter, where I examine the impact of idiosyncratic un-
certainty on issuance of business loans and banks’ safe assets, I analyze impulse responses
of credit and macroeconomic variables in the extended model to microeconomic uncertainty
shock. My result of the impact of microeconomic uncertainty shock on the key aggregates is
in line with empirical findings present in literature29. Specifically, figure 1.15A shows that a
positive shock to uncertainty induces a significant reduction of output, inflation and federal
funds rate. I also find that capital ratio and charge off rate on business loans go up following
a positive shock to microeconomic uncertainty. Controlling for aggregate demand, inflation,
corporate sector indebtedness and capital ratio of banks, commercial and industrial loans go
down following an uncertainty shock by 0.5%. Figure 1.20A demonstrates that there is a sig-
nificant increase of the safe assets’ holdings by banks after an exogenous spike in uncertainty
- by 0.4%. Figure 1.15B shows that the result of the business loans reduction following an
exogenous increase of uncertainty holds not only for the volume of loans inssued, but also
for the share of commercial and industrial loans in portfolios of assets of banks. The share of
business loans goes down by 0.08 pp and stays reduced for a period up to 15 quarters after
a positive shock to uncertainty. Figure 1.20B demonstrates that the result of the safe assets
increase after an uncertainty shock is long-lasting and holds for the share of safe assets in
the portfolios of banks: this share goes up by 0.1 pp with this increase being significantly
positive for after 20 quarters after the impact of the shock.
Real estate loans go down after a positive innovation to uncertainty disregarding the type
of the measure of uncertainty employed. Moreover, unlike the case of C&I loans, uncertainty
shock (together with shock to banks’ capital ratio) is one of the major determinants of mort-
gages volumes’ variance on the horizon of 8 quarters (Table 1.9 in the chapter appendix).
Interestingly, consumer loans increase upon impact of uncertainty shock; this result is
robust to various macroeconomic uncertainty proxies (Figure 1.17A in the chapter appendix
and Figures 22A, 22B, Appendix D). This positive impact of uncertainty on consumer loans
is a brief one, it lasts as statistically significant for 1 quarter following the shock impact. No
significant negative effect of uncertainty on consumer loans is found. I conjecture this might
be the case of increase in demand for consumer loans in more uncertain macroeconomic
environment, when individuals choose to secure external sources of funding due to fore-
seen possibility of being unable to borrow more in future. I suggest that the reasons of this
positive impact of uncertainty shock on consumer loans volumes need to be investigated in
future research.
29See, among others, Bloom (2009), Caldara et al. (2016), Balke and Zeng (2013), Bachmann et al. (2013),
Bonciani and van Roye (2016).
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Banks increase their safe assets holdings following uncertainty shocks (Figures 1.19 and
1.20 in the the chapter appendix Appendix C and Figures 26, 27, 28, Appendix D), thus
reallocating assets in their portfolios by substituting risky loans with cash and securities.
A positive shock to indebtedness of corporates has heterogeneous effects on various
classes of loans. While business and real estate loans go down after a shock to leverage, con-
sumer loans show a significant positive response to positive innovation to leverage. Hence,
this shock makes banks substitute loans issued to firms with loans issued to individuals due
to higher financial fragility of the corporate sector characterized by their higher indebted-
ness. Increase of safe assets holdings in this case does not occur. Forecast error variance
decomposition shows that variance of real estate loans’ volumes is explained by innovations
to corporates’ leverage to a considerable extent: 20-29% of mortgages’ variance is driven by
this factor on 16-24 quarters horizon (Table 1.9 in the chapter appendix). Only 6-7% of busi-
ness loans volumes variance is explained by innovations to leverage of firms (Table 1.8 in
the chapter appendix), for the consumer loans volumes, 1-3% of movements are explained
by the shock to firms’ indebtedness. Hence, how much debt is incurred by firms relative
to their assets, matters primarily for real estate loans issuance30. Interestingly, corporates’
indebtedness is also a statistically significant determinant of total loans’ dynamics: 21-29%
of total loans’ variance is explained by it on the horizon of 11-24 quarters (Table 1.11 in the
chapter appendix).
The impact of positive innovations to capital ratio on various classes of loans is differ-
ent as well: while the effect on business and consumer loans is positive (though statistically
insignificant, see Figure 1.14A and 1.17A, Appendix C), the influence on real estate loans
is statistically significant and negative (Figure 1.16A, Appendix C). The result obtained for
business and consumer loans is consistent with the idea that higher bank equity allows to
hold higher volumes of risky assets on its balance sheet as a protection from insolvency. Real
estate loans decline on impact of balance sheet shock; this negative effect dies out after 5
quarters, and later becomes positive, when banks are in a stronger position to lend. Remark-
ably, this negative effect of balance sheet shock on mortgages is reflected on the dynamics of
total loans, which also go down on impact of a positive shock to banks capital ratio and start
growing through the second year. This negative effect of capital ratio that I find for mort-
gages is in line with finding of Barajas et al. (2015), who use a different VAR specification to
estimate the effect of capital ratio of banks on total loans volumes.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that all the loans components respond to cost shock nega-
tively, while the impact of positive real activity shock is positive on all the classes of loans.
Augmenting the baseline model with additional variables does not change the sign of im-
pulse responses to these two macroeconomic shocks. The effect of a positive innovation to
real activity on safe assets is negative, what makes an evidence for banks’ assets portfolio
reallocation after a real activity shock from securities and cash to loans.
30In this study I don’t distinguish between commercial and residential real estate loans; I conjecture that cor-
porate leverage is a significant determinant of the dynamics of the latter.
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1.4.3 Discussion of results
The results presented here give evidence in favour of bank-lending channel, i.e. that the
Federal Reserve can affect bank’ loan supply schedules by changing reserves. I show that not
only mortgages’ and consumer loans’ issuance declines following monetary contraction31 as
it has been shown, for example, in den Haan et al. (2007) and in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993).
I demonstrate that C&I loans also go down after a shock to federal funds rate, if the risk and
balance sheet variables are controlled for.
We show that importance of risk factors as determinants of C&I loans’ dynamics is greater
than for mortgages and consumer loans. Particularly, forecast error variance decomposi-
tion analysis suggests that credit risk is a critical determinant of business loans’ volumes32,
which, together with macroeconomic uncertainty, explains up to 29% of C&I loans’ vari-
ance. Contrary to this, only up to 17% of business loans variance movements is explained
by all macroeconomic factors together: real activity level, inflation and federal funds rate.
This stands in marked contrast with the characteristics of consumer and real estate loans’ is-
suance. Risk factors - uncertainty and portfolio credit risk - explain up to 12% of the variance
of mortgages, while macroeconomic factors – up to 43%. For consumer loans’ variance up to
26% is explained by risk factors, while macroeconomic factors explain 42%. Hence, compar-
ing with two other classes of loans, the share of variance of business loans explained by risk
factors is substantially higher than what is explained by macroeconomic factors. Therefore,
unlike for mortgages and consumer loans, it is essential that risk factors are controlled for in
a model that aims to provide a satisfactory explanation of the C&I loans’ dynamics.
A possible reason for the impact of risk factors being critical for issuance of business loans
and not for real estate and consumer loans is that risk associated with C&I loans is generally
smaller than risk related to other two classes of loans. First, the rate on loans to corporate cus-
tomers is normally floating, it is more flexible than a rate on consumer loans, for which the
market structure is such that interest rates are less flexible. This allows banks to have the rate
on C&I loans be adjusted to altering macroeconomic conditions. Hence, interest rate risk for
this type of loans is minimized. Second, commercial and industrial lending is often a lending
of relatively short maturity, comparing to other types of loans. This implies lower risk, as the
probability of deterioration of borrower’s financial conditions over a short period is lower
than that over the longer horizon. Besides, shorter maturity increases frequency of loans’ ex-
tensions, thus, banks revise borrowers’ due diligence information and update their contract
terms more frequently. This allows banks to re-optimize contract terms for business lending
according to changing economic environment and to the financial state of a debtor. Third,
closer ties between a bank and its creditors in the case of business loans allow the former to
31The interpretation of consumer and real estate loans reduction following monetary contraction is based on
the fact that banks finance their long-term loans with short-term liabilities. Thus, mortgages, characterized by
long maturity, and consumer loans with their small degree of flexibility of loan rates, are loans with compara-
tively low current-period profit margins. Current-period net earnings on these loans go down after monetary
tightening, because interest rates on these loans changes by less than short-term interest rate. Hence, banks
reduce issuance of consumer and real estate loans following monetary contraction.
32These results are confirmed by cross-correlation and Granger causality tests, see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix
A.
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possess timely information about the latter, hereby attenuating informational asymmetries
between them. This could be due to relationship lending, which facilitates monitoring of
businesses. The outcome is the increased availability of funds to borrowers that have closer
ties to lenders, what is found to be of particular relevance for business lending33. Forth, is-
suing business loans is generally less information-intensive than, for example, mortgages,
what makes them easier to evaluate. Hence, monitoring costs for the C&I loans are smaller.
Thus, commercial and industrial loans are characterized by lower level of risk comparing to
mortgages and consumer loans.
When affected by heightened macroeconomic uncertainty or increased credit risk, busi-
ness loans are likely to lose their perceived status of relatively safe asset, which in other
(normal) conditions allows to earn a stable yield with comparatively low risk. Uncertainty
and risk factors matter, because they induce banks to change expectations about loans prof-
itability: when risk substantializes (for example, the rate of default on loans goes up), the
return on C&I loans declines and/or gets more volatile. To compensate for this decline, risk
premium goes up. Empirical evidence in Aksoy and Basso (2014) corroborates this consider-
ation: they show that an increase in the US bank-level expected financial business profitabil-
ity as measured by the expected mean forecast in earnings per share for major US financial
institutions, leads to a significant decline in yield spreads next to variations in real output
and inflation. In other words, when banks expect decline of their profits, they charge higher
premium for loans issuance, and availability of loans reduces.
Hence, in the conditions of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty and greater credit
risk banks would want to revise their portfolios of assets to take into account changed loans
characteristics and the fact that business loans cannot be regarded as a safe asset anymore.
The terms of business lending are revised more often due to relatively shorter maturity of
C&I loans. As a result, the dynamics of business loans is more sensitive to risk factors than
the dynamics of other types of loans’ issuance. I conjecture that shorter maturity and gener-
ally lower riskiness might be the reasons why risk factors are more influential for dynamic
regularities of commercial and industrial loans, than in case of real estate and consumer
loans.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the dynamic properties of the banking sector loan components and
safe assets holdings. I have estimated a range of structural vector autoregressive models by
using Cholesky decomposition for shocks identification to resolve the puzzle of den Haan
et al. (2007) of a positive response of business loans to monetary contraction and to identify
the key determinants of the various assets in banks’ portfolios. Testing vector autoregressive
models for parameters’ stability with the several versions of Chow tests enabled me to iden-
tify two structural breaks in the relationships between macroeconomic and credit variables
33See, among others, Hoshi et al. (1991), Petersen (1999), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Chakraborty and Charles
(2006), Bharath et al. (2011) for empirical evidence on that.
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with the first break associated with the change in the US monetary policy in the beginning of
1980’s and the second break related to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Taking into account
the identified structural break dates and extending the set of model variables with the lever-
age of corporate sector, credit risk, economic uncertainty and bank capital ratio allowed me
to show that in contrast with the results of den Haan et al. (2007), commercial and indus-
trial loans go down following monetary tightening in line with the predictions of the bank
lending channel of monetary policy over all the time period subsamples analyzed.
I examined impulse response functions and results of the forecast error variance decom-
position analysis of business loans, mortgages and consumer loans and found that the dy-
namic properties of these loan types are significantly different. First, the movements of busi-
ness loans are driven primarily by positive innovations to credit risk, meaning it is critical
to control for credit risk to eliminate the case of omitted variable bias, when trying to ex-
plain the business loans volumes’ dynamics. The changes in consumer loans’ issuance are
attributed primarily to real activity and inflation shocks and to shock to credit risk. The vari-
ance of real estate loans is driven by cost shocks, monetary policy shocks and innovations to
the corporate sector indebtedness. At the same time uncertainty shock is the most important
determinant of the banking sector safe assets’ movements.
Second, I demonstrated that responses of the different classes of loans to the most types
of structural shocks among are heterogeneous. In particular, consumer loans, business loans
and mortgages respond to uncertainty shock, a shock to corporate sector indebtedness, a
shock to capital ratio and to shock to credit risk differently. Consumer loans feature an
increase to a positive shock to corporate sector leverage and a brief increase to a positive
innovation to uncertainty, while the responses of commercial and industrial loans and of
real estate loans to these two types of shocks are negative. On the other hand, smaller vol-
ume of mortgages is issued following a positive shock to bank capital, whereas business and
consumer loans respond to it positively. Finally, business and consumer loans go down sig-
nificantly, when a positive shock to credit risk hits, whereas real estate loans don’t feature a
significant response to it.
Uncertainty shocks are found to induce asset portfolio reallocation by banks: following a
positive innovation to uncertainty, issuance of business loans goes down, while safe assets’
holdings increase. This result is robust to a series of robustness checks, specifically, to order-
ing of variables in the VAR, to measure of uncertainty used and to asset representation in the




The following paragraphs provide details on data definitions, sources and treatment.
Real GDP
Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Ad-
justed, downloaded from Fred II (GDPC1), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Growth variable is annual-
ized quarter to quarter growth rates.
GDP deflator
Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, Index 2009=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Ad-
justed, downloaded from Fred II (GDPDEF), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Federal funds rate
Effective Federal Funds Rate, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted, downloaded
from Fred II (FEDFUNDS), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Source: Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
Short-term interest rate
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, average of monthly data, downloaded from
Fred II (TB3MS), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Sources: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions
Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base (equals total reserves
less total borrowings from the Federal Reserve), Millions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Season-
ally Adjusted. Downloaded from Fred II (TOTRESNS and BORROW), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
Commercial and industrial loans
Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks, Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Sea-
sonally Adjusted, downloaded from Fred II (BUSLOANS), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP implicit
price deflator.
Real estate loans
Real estate loans, All Commercial Banks, Billions of Dollars, Monthly, Not Seasonally Ad-
justed, downloaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1026NCBDM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Quarterly series are averages of monthly
data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP
implicit price deflator.
Consumer loans
Consumer loans, All Commercial Banks, Billions of Dollars, Monthly, Not Seasonally Ad-
justed, downloaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1029NCBDM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Quarterly series are averages of monthly
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data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP
implicit price deflator.
Total loans
Loans and leases in bank credit, All Commercial Banks, Billions of Dollars, Monthly, Not
Seasonally Adjusted, downloaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1020NCBAM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Quarterly series are averages of monthly
data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP
implicit price deflator.
Capital ratio
Calculated as a ratio of Total Equity Capital for Commercial Banks to Total Assets of Com-
mercial Banks. Seasonally Adjusted with X-13ARIMA-SEATS algorithm from the US Census
Bureau.
Total Equity Capital for Commercial Banks in the U.S., Thousands of Dollars, Quarterly, Not
Seasonally Adjusted, downloaded from Fred II (USTEQC), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
Total Assets of Commercial Banks in the U.S., Millions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted, downloaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1151NCBDM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (US).
Charge-off rates
Charge-off rate on business loans, consumer loans, real estate loans and total loans, all com-
mercial banks, Percentage, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted, downloaded from Data Down-
load Program (CHGDEL), see http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Source: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
Leverage
Calculated as a ratio of Total assets to Net worth of nonfinancial corporate business. Season-
ally Adjusted with X-13ARIMA-SEATS algorithm from the US Census Bureau.
Total assets of nonfinancial corporate business, Millions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted, downloaded from Data Download Program (Z1/Z1/FL102000005.Q).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (US).
Net worth of nonfinancial corporate business, Millions of Dollars, Quarterly, Not Seasonally
Adjusted, downloaded from Data Download Program (Z1/Z1/FL102090005.Q).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (US).
Safe assets
Calculated as a sum of Cash assets and Treasury and agency securities of all commercial
banks.
Cash assets, all commercial banks, Millions of Dollars, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted, down-
loaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1048NCBAM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Quarterly series are averages of monthly
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data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP
implicit price deflator.
Treasury and agency securities, all commercial banks, Millions of Dollars, Monthly, Season-
ally Adjusted, downloaded from Data Download Program (H8/H8/B1003NCBAM).
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. Quarterly series are averages of monthly
data. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). Deflated with GDP
implicit price deflator.
Uncertainty – news-based index
A normalized index of the volume of news articles discussing economic policy uncertainty,
constructed by the Economic Policy Uncertainty project, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
Uncertainty – composite policy uncertainty index
An overall index measuring policy-related economic uncertainty, constructed by the Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty project, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
Uncertainty – VXO index, the stock market option-based implied volatility
The Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index VXO, Quarterly (aggregation method -
average), Not Seasonally Adjusted, downloaded from Fred II (VIXCLS), see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange.
Uncertainty – cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’ pretax profit growth
The within-quarter cross-sectional spread of pretax profit growth rates normalized by av-
erage sales, using data on firms with at least 150 quarters of available data34 taken from
Compustat quarterly accounts and is calculated by Bloom (2009) according to
pgt =
pit − pit−1
0.5 (St − St−1) ,
where pit and St are firm’s profit and sales respectively, where the highest and the low-
est 0.05% values of pgt are disregarded such that the resulting series is not driven by outliers.
Downloaded from https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/sites/default/files/replication.zip.
Source: Nicholas Bloom data.
Uncertainty – cross-firm spread of stock returns
The interquartile range of firms’ monthly stock returns for all public firms with no less than
300 months of data from the Center of Research in Security Prices over 1960-2010. The re-
turns are windsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5% growth rates to eliminate the extreme
values to affect the series. Downloaded from https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/sites/
default/files/census_data.zip. Source: Nicholas Bloom data.
34This is done to minimize the effects of sample composition changes.
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Figure 1.1: Variables’ series in levels.
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Figure 1.2: Measures of macroeconomic uncertainty
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Figure 1.3: Assets in portfolios of commercial banks








Real estate loans 1947Q1 14-34%
Consumer loans 1947Q1 7-13%
Safe assets 1973Q1 13-34%
Aforementioned asset types 66-79%
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Real GDP 0.39: 2Q lag 0.26: 1Q lag 0.15: contemp. -0.22: 3Q lag
GDP deflator -0.20: 5Q lag -0.19: 4Q lag -0.20: 4Q lag -0.19: 2Q lead
Federal funds
rate
0.29: 1Q lead 0.22: 2Q lead -0.16: 5Q lag -0.19: 3Q lag
Leverage of cor-
porates
-0.20: 5Q lag N/S N/S N/S
Charge-off rate -0.71: 1Q lag -0.62: 4Q lag 0.25: contemp. 0.37: 2Q lead




























-0.41: 2Q lags -0.39: 2Q lag N/S 0.29: 1Q lead
Uncertainty:
VXO index
-0.58: 4Q lag N/S N/S 0.34: contemp.
Note. The variables’ growth rates are analyzed. Uncertainty measures, charge-off rates,
reported changes in lending standards, in demand for loans and in banks’ tolerance of risk
are in taken levels. Quarterly data is used. Lag and lead qualifications are given for the
variables in columns (classes of assets) with respect to variables in rows (for example, real
GDP); 2Q lag for commercial and industrial loans with real GDP means GDP values lead
loan volumes by 2 quarters. N/S stands for statistically non-significant result. Contemp.
stand for contemporaneous relationship.
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Table 1.6: Pairwise Granger causality tests









GDP deflator C&I loans





Federal funds rate C&I loans





Corporate leverage C&I loans





Charge-off rate C&I loans





Capital ratio C&I loans





Conditional volatility of GDP growth C&I loans





Unconditional volatility of GDP growth C&I loans





VIX index C&I loans





News-based uncertainty index C&I loans






Forecasters’ disagreement about future CPI C&I loans





Composite economic uncertainty index C&I loans





Note. The pairwise Granger causality tests were run between the volume of commercial
and industrial loans and one of macro, financial or uncertainty variables. The cases of sig-
nificant Granger causality are shown in bold. The null hypothesis is that one variable does
not Granger-cause another variable, 95% significance level is used. The tests are run using
2 lags, what corresponds to the number of lags used in the vector autoregression models,
where they are selected using relevant information criteria.
Table 1.7: Conditional heteroskedasticity of GDP growth
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-statistic p-value
c 2.11 0.28 7.66 0.00
θ 0.37 0.07 5.42 0.00
ω 0.48 0.29 1.68 0.09
α 0.18 0.04 4.07 0.00
β 0.80 0.04 19.37 0.00
Note. GARCH(1,1) model parameters’ estimates.
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1.6.2 Structural break tests
To test for structural breaks I use the versions of Chow tests suggested by Canova (2007),
Lutkepohl (2001) and Doornik and Hendry (1997).
For the fixed break date that might have occurred in period TB the model is estimated
on the full sample data of T observations and from the first T1 and the last T2 observations,
where T1 < TB and T2 ≤ T − TB. The resulting residuals are denoted by ût, û1t and û2t ,
respectively. The following covariance matrices are calculated:
Σ̂1,2 = T−11 Σ
T1
t=1ûtût





















Using this notation, the break-point Chow test statistics is calculated as:
λBP = (T1 + T2) log
∣∣∣∑̂1,2 ∣∣∣ − T1log ∣∣∣Σ̂1 ∣∣∣ − T2log ∣∣∣Σ̂2 ∣∣∣ ∼ χ2(k),
where k is the number of restrictions imposed by assuming a constant coefficient model
for the full sample period, that is, k is the difference between the sum of the number of
coefficients estimated in the first and last subperiods and the number of coefficients in the
full sample model. The null hypothesis of the model’s parameters constancy is rejected if the
value of the test statistic λSS is large.
The sample-split Chow test statistics is obtained under the assumption that the resid-
ual covariance matrix is constant. This statistics also checks the null hypothesis against the
alternative that the coefficients of the VAR models may vary and is calculated as:
λSS = (T1 + T2) [log
∣∣∣∑̂1,2 ∣∣∣ − ∣∣∣T−1 (T1Σ̂1 + T2Σ̂2)∣∣∣] ∼ χ2(k)
The Chow forecast methodology tests the null against the alternative that all the coeffi-
cients including the residual variance-covariance matrix vary. It rejects the null hypothesis
of constant parameters for the large values of test statistic. The test statistic is calculated as:
λCF =






∼ F(nk, Ns− q),






, q = nk2 + 1,






When the break date is treated as unknown, Chow tests are performed repeatedly for a
range of potential break dates TB, as suggested by Canova (2007) and Lutkepohl (2001). The
value of split-sample test statistic is maximized over the interval [t1, t2], where the break is
50
suspected to have happened: supTB∈T T ⊂ [t1, t2]. The asymptotic distribution of the sup test
statistic is not χ2 , but of a different type, see Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
and Andrews (2003).
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1.6.3 Impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition
Figure 1.4: Responses of commercial and industrial loans to shocks in the baseline model
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – per-
cents, X axis units – quarters.
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Figure 1.5: Responses of real estate loans to shocks in the baseline model
A. 1954Q1-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – per-
cents, X axis units – quarters.
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Figure 1.6: Responses of consumer loans to shocks in the baseline model
A. 1954Q1-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – per-
cents, X axis units – quarters.
54
Figure 1.7: Responses of total loans to shocks in the baseline model
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – per-
cents, X axis units – quarters.
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Figure 1.8: Responses of Treasury and agency securities in banks’ assets to shocks in the
baseline model
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – per-
cents, X axis units – quarters.
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Figure 1.9: Responses of commercial and industrial loans to shocks in the baseline model,
alternative identification
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the alternative specification: the federal funds rate
is a monetary policy measure, X1t is empty (all the variables are in X2t). 90% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – percents, X axis
units – quarters.
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Figure 1.10: Responses of real estate loans to shocks in the baseline model, alternative iden-
tification
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the alternative specification: the federal funds rate
is a monetary policy measure, X1t is empty (all the variables are in X2t). 90% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – percents, X axis
units – quarters.
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Figure 1.11: Responses of consumer loans to shocks in the baseline model, alternative iden-
tification
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the alternative specification: the federal funds rate
is a monetary policy measure, X1t is empty (all the variables are in X2t). 90% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – percents, X axis
units – quarters.
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Figure 1.12: Responses of totel loans to shocks in the baseline model, alternative identifica-
tion
A. 1954Q4-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the alternative specification: the federal funds rate
is a monetary policy measure, X1t is empty (all the variables are in X2t). 90% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – percents, X axis
units – quarters.
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Figure 1.13: Responses of Treasury and agency securities to shocks in the baseline model,
alternative identification
A. 1954Q1-1979Q4 B. 1983Q1-2007Q4
C. 2010M4-2015M12
Note. The impulse responses are based on the alternative specification: the federal funds rate
is a monetary policy measure, X1t is empty (all the variables are in X2t). 90% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). Y axis units – percents, X axis
units – quarters.
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Figure 1.14: Impulse response functions, the extended model with commercial and industrial
loans, uncertainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
A. Responses of commercial and industrial loans to various shocks, in %.
B. Impulse response functions to monetary policy shock (monetary contraction), in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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C. Impulse response functions to uncertainty shock, in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Table 1.8: Forecast error variance decomposition of commercial and industrial loans in the
extended model, uncertainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
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D. Impulse response functions to uncertainty shock, the extended model with commer-
cial and industrial loans, uncertainty measure – conditional heteroskedasticity of GDP growth,
1985Q1-2007Q4.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Figure 1.15: Impulse response functions, the extended model with commercial and indus-
trial loans; uncertainty measure – cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’ pretax profit
growth
A. Impulse response functions to uncertainty shock, C&I loans in levels.
B. Impulse response functions to uncertainty shock, C&I loans as the share of the portfo-
lio.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. X axis units – quarters.
66
Figure 1.16: Impulse response functions, the extended model with real estate loans, uncer-
tainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
A. Responses of real estate loans to various shocks, in %.
B. Impulse response functions to monetary policy shock (monetary contraction), in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes four lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Table 1.9: Forecast error variance decomposition of real estate loans in the extended model,
uncertainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
68
Figure 1.17: Impulse response functions, the extended model with consumer loans, uncer-
tainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
A. Responses of consumer loans to various shocks, in %.
B. Impulse response functions to monetary policy shock (monetary contraction), in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Table 1.10: Forecast error variance decomposition of real consumer loans in the extended
model, uncertainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
70
Figure 1.18: Impulse response functions, the extended model with total loans, uncertainty
measure – news-based uncertainty index
A. Responses of total loans to various shocks, in %.
B. Impulse response functions to monetary policy shock (monetary contraction), in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes four lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Table 1.11: Forecast error variance decomposition of total loans in the extended model, un-
certainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
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Figure 1.19: Impulse response functions, the extended model with safe assets, uncertainty
measure – news-based uncertainty index
A. Responses of safe assets to various shocks, in %.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Table 1.12: Forecast error variance decomposition of safe assets in the extended model, un-
certainty measure – news-based uncertainty index
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Figure 1.20: Impulse response functions to uncertainty shock, extended model with safe as-
sets; uncertainty measure – cross-sectional standard deviation of firms’ pretax profit growth
A. Safe assets variable in levels.
B. Safe assets variable as a share of total assets.
Note. The impulse responses are based on the benchmark specification: the federal funds
rate is a monetary policy measure, X2t is empty (all the variables are in X1t). 90% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands are calculated as in Kilian (1998). According to AIC,
the VAR order includes two lags. Y axis units – percents, X axis units – quarters.
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Chapter 2
Banks’ assets, uncertainty and
macroeconomy
2.1 Introduction
Being an important factor of slow economic recovery, weak growth of credit in the aftermath
of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has been a serious concern of policymakers. Despite highly
accomodative stance of monetary policy and various policies to enhance credit supply and to
support credit demand, near-zero or negative growth of bank lending has been experienced
by many advanced economies for a number of years1 (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in Appendix).
Given that efficient credit allocation is one of the pillars of growth2, its weakness hinders the
full and sustained economic recovery.
A number of recent studies demonstrated that uncertainty have played a prominent role
in shaping credit market developments during the financial crisis of 2007-20093. The previ-
ous chapter provides robust evidence showing that banks reallocate their portfolios of assets
following uncertainty shocks by reducing issuance of loans and increasing holdings of safe
assets - cash and Treasury and agency securities. Based on this finding and responding to
calls for more sophisticated modeling of financial intermediaries due to their nontrivial role
in the recent financial crisis, I build a general equilibrium model, introducing two features
into the banking sector modelling. First, I use a firm-theoretical model of bank behaviour
and model banks as optimizing their balance sheet structure by solving the porfolio prob-
lem, where banks choose to allocate their funds between risky lending to entrepreneurs and
risk-free government bonds. Second, motivated by empirical evidence and along the lines
of theoretical literature, I model banks as risk-averse agents4. In practice banks should hold
1For details see IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013).
2The importance of intermediation-growth nexus in data is studied by King and Levine (1993), Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Ferdandez and Udell
(2005) and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998, 2000), among others. Chretien and Lyonnet (2014) show that cutbacks
in lending by commercial banks was the main reason for the contraction in the balance sheet of the overall
financial system during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
3See, for example, Stock and Watson (2012), Balke and Zeng (2013), Caldara et al. (2016), Baum et al. (2008)
and Quagliariello (2008).
4Evidence suggesting concave preferences of banks are Ratti (1980), Bhaumik and Piesse (2001), Nishiyama
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a sufficient level of capital to protect themselves from the risk of insolvency, what under-
pins their negative attitude to uncertainty about future profitability. Aksoy and Basso (2014)
and Danielsson et al. (2011) show that in presence of the Value-at-Risk constraint banks be-
have like risk-averse agents. Assuming concave preferences allows uncertainty to play a
non-trivial role in banks’ portfolio allocation.
In the theoretical model suggested here, banking sector faces non-diversifiable credit risk.
This risk emerges, because loans are subject to default and because lending rate on non-
defaulted loans specified in the loan contract is non state-contingent on future outcomes. I
modify the optimal debt contract structure proposed originally in Bernanke et al. (1999) to
allow lending rates be non-contingent on realization of shocks, such that banks could obtain
non-zero profits, when an ex-post rate of defaults on loans is different from the rate that was
expected by banks ex-ante. Heightened idiosyncratic uncertainty - a greater cross-sectional
dispersion of productivity, - increases the rate of entrepreneurial defaults, and banks respond
by increasing risk premium. Importantly, precautionary mechanism is in play: risk-averse
banks charge lending rate, which in addition to remunerating for the increased expected
defaults, provides self-insurance from profitability reduction. Thereby banks’ expectations
about their future profitability play key role in driving the endogenous movements of credit
spread. In this respect the amplification mechanism in my model is in line with the one in
Aksoy and Basso (2014), where term spreads’ variations are brought about by expectations of
banks of their future profitability5. Due to increasing external finance premium, the demand
for loans falls. The asset portfolios of banks are reallocated: the share of risky lending goes
down, while the share of risk-free assets (government bonds), acting as a buffer stock, goes
up.
The simulations of the general equilibrium model reproduce a pattern, specified by a key
postulate of the modern portfolio theory - that choices of an agent with concave preferences
are characterized by a positive premium to the amount that she is willing to pay to avoid a
fair gamble. Importantly, there are significant differences in the ways how this result is ob-
tained in the modern portfolio theory and in the model suggested here. First, in my case risk
is not measured by the variance of distribution of returns, as it is done commonly in the mod-
ern portfolio approach6. Instead, in the model here risk is a downside measure, specifically,
it is a probability that idiosyncratic productivity of a borrower is lower than the one that
allows her to pay back the loan (a borrower who cannot pay back the loan declares default).
The size of credit risk, that the bank is prone to, is determined endogenously and follows
from the structure of the optimal debt contract between banks and entrepreneurs. Second, I
don’t employ a quadratic utility function, which is conventionally used in the modern port-
folio theory to analyze the problem of portfolio allocation of the risk-averse investor and to
(2007) and Raju (2014), among others. Theoretical papers employing an analogous assumption are, for example,
Parkin (1970), Pyle (1971), Ross (1973), Hart and Jaffee (1974), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Morrison (2000) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990).
5Aksoy and Basso (2014) also provide empirical evidence that corroborates the link between expected bank
profitability and term spreads movements.
6There is a growing amount of works, however, where risk is characterized by a downside measure. See, for
example, Chaigneau and Eeckhoudt (2016).
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demonstrate how concavity of investor’s preferences affects the optimal choice of the frac-
tion of portfolio invested in the risky asset. I assume a constant relative risk aversion type of
utility function for banks. Third, risk-free rate in the suggested model is unknown ex-ante,
in contrast to it being known in advance in the modern portfolio theory; additionally, it is
determined endogenously, responding to the movements of output and inflation according
to the Taylor rule.
Uncertainty has received a substantial attention as a factor that exerts an important im-
pact on economic developments during the Great Recession. Stock and Watson (2013) ar-
gue that the decline of output and employment in the Great Recession was mainly due
to financial and uncertainty shocks. Recent empirical macro- and microeconomic research
documents strong negative relationship between uncertainty and growth. This is demon-
strated, for example, in cross-country studies of Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Engle and
Rangel (2008). A VAR approach is used by Bloom (2009) to show that there is a drop and
rebound of industrial production following the impact of uncertainty shock. By estimating
a fully fledged DSGE model, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) demonstrate that decline in the
volatility of output in the mid-1980s happened due to change in volatility of various types
of technology shocks7. Additionally, Aastveit et al. (2013) and Bloom et al. (2012) show that
increased uncertainty weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. As for microeconomic
evidence, significant negative effect of uncertainty on investment in the firm-level panel data
is shown by Leahy and Whited (1996). Guiso and Parigi (1999) document the negative im-
pact of uncertainty on firms’ expectations of demand. Bloom, Bond and van Reenen (2007)
demonstrate that uncertainty gives rise to the "caution effect", while Panousi and Papaniko-
laou (2012) show that negative effect of uncertainty appears to be management risk-aversion.
To sum up, uncertainty is demonstrated to be an important factor that drives the dynamics
of economy at both macro and micro levels.
In existing literature some papers analyze the effects of heightened uncertainty about
total factor productivity8, while other works investigate the impact of shocks to idiosyn-
cratic productivity of firms9. I contribute to this literature by evaluating the impact that
idiosyncratic uncertainty makes on the portfolio reallocation of the banking sector and the
resulting general equilibrium macroeconomic effects. The uncertainty is modelled as a time-
varying volatility of idiosyncratic productivity component of entrepreneurs, so that in times
of heightened uncertainty the probability of the events on the tails of the distribution of
entrepreneurial productivity is higher. This implies not only increased credit risk, what
induces risk-neutral banks to charge a higher risk premium to compensate for the greater
possible losses, but also greater uncertainty about the future bank profitability, what makes
7Among other papers, showing that uncertainty shocks produce economic contractions are Bachmann et al.
(2013), Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and Knotek and Khan (2011).
8See, for example, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Basu and Bundick (2012), Bloom et al. (2012), among others.
9Bloom et al. (2012), Christiano et al. (2013) and Bachmann and Bayer (2011) study the effect of changing
volatility of cross-sectional dispersion of firm-level productivity. The relative importance of aggregate and id-
iosyncratic uncertainty, which are sometimes referred to as macro and micro uncertainty, is studied in Balke et
al. (2012) and Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2014).
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risk-averse banks increase risk premium further to self-insure against profitability reduction.
I find that the proposed mechanism of precautionary motive of risk-averse banks produces
significant portfolio reallocation effects, it helps to explain an additional portion of the risky
lending reduction and business cycle movements.
Another stream of literature, related to my work, explores the role of credit frictions as a
factor that contributes to business cycle fluctuations. Despite employing different workhorse
models with various types of frictions, the key studies in this literature - Bernanke et al.
(1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), - agree that financial frictions have significant effects on movement of aggregates.
They don’t only make an impact as amplifying the effect of exogenous shocks10, but also
act as a source of disturbancies that play an important role for business cycles11. The recent
and growing literature anlyses the role of credit market imperfections in amplifying the ef-
fect of uncertainty. Among those, Arellano et al. (2012) demonstrate that higher uncertainty
is a factor that reduces factor inputs of firms and their output, when firms are subject to
costly default. Christiano et al. (2013) and Gilchrist et al. (2013) show that idiosyncratic
uncertainty shocks increase the external financial premium in presence of asymmetric infor-
mation in lending relationships. Benes and Kumhof (2015) also analyze the general equi-
librium model with financial accelerator and endogenous risky lending; they focus on bank
capital adequacy requirements and demonstrate that countercyclical capital buffers increase
welfare. Bonciani and van Roye (2013) show that stickiness of banking retail interest rates
amplifies the effect of TFP uncertainty uncertainty on economy. Balke and Zeng (2013) show
that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was mostly due to decline in financial intermediation
that originated from output and uncertainty shocks.
I contribute to the literature on credit frictions by showing that in the financial accelerator
framework a la Bernanke et al. (1999), where lenders are risk-averse and choose their balance
sheets volumes before observing shock values, heightened idiosyncratic uncertainty leads,
first, to widening of credit spread, and second, to lowering of the volume of bank credit. I
demonstrate that allowing for concave preferences of banks gives rise to the precautionary
savings motive, such that assets portfolios of banks are reallocated, what is consistent with
my empirical results presented in chapter 1. I show that financial accelerator mechanism
works to amplify these effects, as the reduced demand for capital from entrepreneurs induces
price of capital to go down, such that entrepreneurial net worth decreases, implying even
higher risk premium charged by banks and the further reduction of bank credit.
2.2 Uncertainty and risk-averse banking sector
This section provides intuition for the dynamics of bank portfolio obtained in the general
equilibrium setup of the model in this chapter below. It introduces the idea of bank’s pre-
10See, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Balke (2000) on this.
11For example, Christiano et al. (2010) distinguishes between a banking technology shock and a bank reserve
demand shock, which have consequential effects on movements of total output. Hafstead and Smith (2012)
examine the role of a shock to bank-specific loan productivity or a shock to the cost of bank intermediation).
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cautionary motive when there is uncertainty about bank future profitability.
Consider a case with a representative risk-averse bank in economy. The bank funds its
activity by issuing deposits for households Dt and allocates its funds to corporate loans Lt
and riskless government bonds Bt. Issuing loans is risky and yields higher return than the
return on government bonds: risk premium compensates for risk of issuing loans. Bank’s
stylized balance sheet constraint is:
Dt = Lt + Bt, (2.1)
and the profits of the bank are:
Et(pit+1) = (rltLt)νt + r
g
t Bt − rdtDt, (2.2)
where rlt is the bank’s lending rate, r
g
t is risk-free rate on government bonds, r
d
t is rate on
deposits and νt is the share of non-defaulted loans12.
Under the assumption of bank being risk-neutral the no-arbitrage condition implies that
deposit rate coincides with risk-free rate, and risk spread is accounted by default rate on





t ∗ νt. (2.3)
In this case bank would satisfy all the demand for loans and deposits adjusting the volume
of govenment bonds held on its balance sheet.
Instead of risk-neutrality let’s assume that bank’s preferences are represented with utility
function u(· ) featuring risk-prudence, following the definition of prudence from Kimball




The optimizing behaviour of a risk-averse bank is different from that of a risk-neutral
one. In maximizing its expected utility, risk-averse bank takes into account the stochastic
nature of the share of non-defaulted firms νt14. Ultimately, νt could depend on stochastic
properties of idiosyncratic return to capital (including its time-varying volatility that I refer
to as idiosyncratic uncertainty) or/and on stochastic properties of the aggregate productivity
process.
To examine the impact of uncertainty on bank’s choice of risky and safe assets share in
its portfolio, consider that increased uncertainty induces banks to take into account a wider
range of possible values of future profits around E(pit+1): from the lowest possible piLt+1 to
12Throughout the chapter all the interest rates are gross rates. Lower case letters denote nominal interest rates
and upper case letters denote real interest rates.
13The terms risk-averse and risk-prudent are used interchangingly here.
14In the general equilibrium setup of the model this share is endogenous: it is a function of the equilibrium
threshold level of idiosyncratic productivity shock that separates bankrupt and non-bankrupt entrepreneurs.
This cut-off value is a solution of the entrepreneurial maximization problem. See the Optimal Debt Contract
section for details.
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Figure 2.1: Impact of uncertainty on expected profit of a bank
the highest possible piHt+1 (see Figure 2.1). Because the function of marginal profit u
′(pit+1) is
convex (u′′′(· ) > 0), Jensen inequality implies E(u′(pit+1)) > u′(E(pit+1)). Thus, when there
is uncertainty about future returns, expected marginal utility is higher than in the case of no
uncertainty. Higher expected marginal utility of profit in period t + 1 requires lower level
of profit pit+1, what is attained by changing the structure of its portfolio: issuing less risky
loans Lt, which pay higher return, and increasing the holdings of safe low-yield government
bonds Bt. Hence, the effect of heightened uncertainty on the portfolio of risk-averse bank
is a greater share of safe assets; risk-averse banks smooth out their profit across states of
nature by increasing their riskless bonds holding motivated by precautionary considerations.
Specifically, they choose to ensure the relative stability of the profit aiming at avoiding the
possible realisation of critically high level of defaults.
2.3 The general equilibrium model
The theoretical model suggested in this chapter is a general equilibrium model based on the
costly state verification setup and the financial accelerator mechanism drawn from Bernanke
et al. (1999) with risk-averse portfolio optimizing banking sector and non-diversifiable credit
risk. I endogenize bank credit spread and analyze the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty
shocks on portfolio reallocation of the banking sector and macroeconomic outcomes. The
model economy is populated with households, entrepreneurs, banks, capital goods produc-
ers, final good producers, the government and a monetary policy authority. Households
consume, supply labour and save via bank deposits. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate
goods using capital, financed either internally from the net worth or externally by borrow-
ing funds from the banks. The banking sector allocates deposits raised from households to
risky loans and risk-free bonds. Capital goods producers sell capital, that they create, to
entrepreneurs. Final good producers resell intermediate goods, produced by entrepreneurs,
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with a markup. The government issues riskless bonds and buys the final good. The central
bank implements monetary policy.
2.3.1 Banking sector
There is a representative bank in economy owned by households, that provides loans to
entrepreneurs and funds its investments by households’ deposits. The bank also buys gov-
ernment bonds that pay risk-free rate. At time t the balance sheet of the bank is:
Dt = Lt + Bt, (2.5)
where current period deposits Dt constitute liabilities, and loans Lt issued for entrepreneurs
and risk-free government bonds Bt purchased today comprise asset side of the balance sheet.
At the end of period t the bank chooses how to allocate its funds in portfolio of assets, which
will generate the return in period t + 1: Lt and Bt are chosen at time t, i.e. the timing of
bank assets corresponds to the time, when the loans are issued and bonds are purchased
and not when the payoff occurs. A specialized loan branch within the bank issues loans for
entrepreneurs and performs the monitoring of loans function15. It receives Lt from its parent
branch at period t and commits to pay back non-state contingent nominal interest rate ret , set
by the parent branch at time t+ 1 . The allocation of assets between lending and safe assets
holding is decided by the parent branch.
The expected profit of the banking sector Πt+1 is the difference between its expected in-
come and expenses, where incomes comprise the principal and interest on non-defaulted
loans, the assets of defaulted entrepreneurs less the costs of monitoring them and the princi-
pal and interest on government bonds, while expenses paid include the principal and interest
on deposits issued to households in period t:
EtΠt+1 = Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + (1− µ)Vdt+1 + rGt Bt − rDt Dt] (2.6)
where (1− F(ω¯t+1)) is the ex-post share of non-defaulted borrowers, rLt is lending rate for
loans issued at time t, (1− µ)Vdt+1 is the value of assets of defaulted firms took over by the
bank after paying the monitoring costs µ, rDt Dt is bank’s payment for households’ deposits
issued at t and rGt Bt is the return on govertment bonds purchased at t. Bank profit Πt+1 is
transferred lump-sum to households at the end of period t+ 1.
I assume concave preferences of the banking sector. First, there is multiple evidence
demonstrating that banks act as risk-averse agents in empirical literature. This is shown,
for example, in Ratti (1980), Bhaumik and Piesse (2001), Nishiyama (2007) and Raju (2014).
Additionally, some papers demonstrate that the choices of bank managers reveal their risk-
averse type of preferences16. Second, the assumption of concavity of bank preferences is a
15I use this assumption following Christiano et al. (2010).
16Evidence of bank managers’ risk-aversion is presented, for instance, in Flannery (1989), Hughes and Mester
(1998), Pecchenino (1998) and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012).
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commone one in theoretical literature on financial intermediation17. Third, the use of this as-
sumption could be justified by the fact that in practice banks should hold a sufficient level of
capital to protect themselves from the risk on insolvency. As a result, banks are non-neutral
to uncertainty about future payoffs on loans and profitability, instead, they have negative
attitude to this uncertainty. Aksoy and Basso (2014) and Danielsson et al. (2011) show that in
presence of the Value-at-Risk constraint18 banks behave like risk-averse agents. In particu-
lar, they show that Lagrange mupliplier associated with the capital constraint enters into the
banks’ lending decisions just like a risk-aversion parameter, and as a result, adopting the
risk-aversiness assumption is isomorphic to modelling risk-neutrality of risk-constrained
banks. The aforementioned considerations support the use of assumption of concavity of
bank preferences that I employ here.
I assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type of utility function. The flow of




1− κ . (2.7)
At time t the management of the parent branch of the bank chooses the share of the portfolio,
to be invested in risky loans αt = LtDt , to maximize its expected utility, taking into account the









where St,t+1 = β
C−σt+1
C−σt pit+1
is the households’ stochastic discount factor. Because both deposit
rate and rate on government bonds are riskless, I use a simplifying assumption that rGt = r
D
t
in each period, and rearrange the expression for bank profit (2.6) (see Technical appendix for
details) and obtain:
EtΠt+1 = Et[Lt((1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt − rGt ) + (1− µ)Vdt+1]. (2.9)
The first order condition of the bank problem is (details can be found in the Technical ap-
pendix to this chapter):
Et[Π−κt+1(r
L,RA
t (1− F(ω¯t+1))− rGt )] = 0, (2.10)
where rL,RAt stands for the lending rate charged by a risk-averse bank.
To emphasize, the decision about the share of risky loans in portfolio αt is made at time t
(accordingly, interest rate on loans rLt is set at t), while the expected value of future profitabil-
17See, for example, Parkin (1970), Pyle (1971), Hart and Jaffee (1974), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Freixas and
Rochet (2008) and Matthews and Thompson (2008).
18VaR constraint is a quantile measure of losses distribution, which limits the probability of portfolio losses. It
states that losses of bank portfolio should not exceed the value of its net worth NWt, thus, ensuring solvency of
the bank with probability (1− α): VaRα(Losst) ≤ NWt. Importance of accounting for VaR constraint has been
emphasized, for example, by Adrian and Shin (2013).
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ity at t+ 1 is taken into account. In contrast, risk-neutral banks, who are profit maximizers,
have linear preferences about their future profit. Hence, the optimality condition assuming
banks’ risk-neutrality is:
rL,RNt Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))] = rGt , (2.11)
where rL,RNt stands for the lending rate charged by a risk-neutral bank.
As seen from (2.10) and (2.11), both types of banks charge lending rates, which are set
to compensate for the risk of defaults on entrepreneurial loans F(ω¯t+1). The difference is
that banks with concave preferences also take into account the expected value of their fu-
ture profitability, specifically, the marginal utility of future profit. By using the fact that rLt
becomes known at t and applying the definition of covariance and the linearity property of




+Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))]] = rGt . (2.12)
By comparing (2.11) and (2.12), one can see that the difference between lending rates rL,RNt
and rL,RAt depends on the sign of covariance Cov(Π
−κ
t+1, (1− F(ω¯t+1))) in the left hand side of
(2.12). Given that the share of non-defaulted entrepreneurs is correlated with bank profitabil-
ity positively, its correlation with the marginal utility of profit is negative due to assumption
of bank preferences’ concavity. Hence, Cov(Π−κt+1, (1− F(ω¯t+1))) < 0. The negative covari-
ance in (2.12) decreases the multiplier of rL,RAt in the left hand side of (2.12) comparing to
the multiplier of rL,RNt in the left hand side of (2.11). Therefore, under equal risk-free rates
and under the same expected rate of entrepreurial defaults, the lending rate charged by risk-
averse banks exceeds the one charged by risk-neutral banks rL,RAt > r
L,RN
t .
The difference in risk premia charged by risk-neutral and risk-averse banks is explained
by the precautionary mechanism: in view of heightened uncertainty risk-averse banks in-
sure themselves from future profitability reduction anticipating increasing defaults. They
increase risk premium today to diminish profitability reduction tomorrow that could arise
due to elevated uncertainty. Banks’ expectations about their future profitability play a key
role in driving the endogenous movements of credit spread in my model. This link between
bank spreads and their expected profitability was shown first in Aksoy and Basso (2014)
to deliver endogenous movements in term spreads’ variations; they also provide empirical
evidence to corroborate it.
To show the effect of default risk and expected profitability on risk premium, I manip-
























Additionally, risk premium of the risk-averse banking sector RPRAt features two properties.




Second, it increases in tightness of connection between profits and the rate of loans repay-
ment:
∂RPRAt
∂Cov(Πt+1, (1− F(ω¯t+1))) > 0, (2.17)
i.e. the more risk-averse bank relies on loans’ repayment as a source of profit (in contrast
to relying on assets of defaulted entrepreneurs), the higher risk premium it charges. These
last two channels constitute the precautionary mechanism that characterizes the choices of
risk-averse bank and induces lending rate charged by risk-averse to exceed the rate charged
by risk-neutral one.
Notably, the analytical result of this section is in line with the conclusions of the modern
portfolio theory that are derived under different assumptions. First, in the model here risk is
not measured by the variance of distribution of returns, as it is done commonly in the modern
portfolio approach. Instead, risk is a downside measure - a probability that idiosyncratic
productivity of a borrower is lower than the one that allows her to pay back the loan. Second,
I don’t employ a quadratic utility function, which is conventionally used in the modern
portfolio theory, but a constant relative risk aversion type of utility function for banks.
Another consideration worth noting is a distinct nature of the eminent precautionary
saving mechanism, which arises in the households’ consumption-saving problem, and the
precautionary motive at work suggested here. In particular, the precautionary saving is
brought about by higher variance of exogenous shock to household income, which increases
the optimal choice of saving, if marginal utility is convex19. Instead here a positive shock to
the variance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial productivity component increases the optimal
value of lending rate charged on loans by banks, when their preferences feature concavity.
19I follow the formulation of the precautionary saving mechanism along the lines of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1971) and Kimball (1990).
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2.3.2 Households
A representative household chooses consumption Ct, total labour supply Hht and bank de-







βk[ln(Ct+k) + ξ ln(1− Hht+k)] (2.18)
subject to budget constraint
PtCt + Dt ≤WtHht +Πt + rDt−1Dt−1, (2.19)
where Pt is aggregate price level, Wt is nominal wage, Πt is the profit of banks paid out to
households, who own the banks as dividends, and rDt−1Dt−1 is the nominal return on savings
deposits issued in t− 1.











= C−1t Wt/Pt, (2.21)
where the first one is Euler equation for real consumption, and the second one is intratem-
poral condition that determines tradeoff between real consumption and leisure. Stochastic






Entrepreneurs are producers of the wholesale output Yt. They live for a finite number of peri-
ods and are risk-neutral; in each period a probability of survival γ is constant. Entrepreneurs
combine capital Kt, purchased in period t− 1, with labour Ht hired in t to produce wholesale
output in the period t. Production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, what
enables using it as an aggregate relationship, rather than focusing on production function of
each entrepreneur:
Yt = AtKαt H
1−α
t , (2.23)
where At is an exogenous parameter of aggregate productivity.
Following Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), it is assumed that
entrepreneurs supply labour in the general labour market to supplement their income. This
assumption is made for a technical reason, in order for new and bankrupt entrepreneurs to
have some net worth that allows them to start operations. Total labour input, used in the
wholesale good production, is a composite of labour, supplied by entrepreneurs Het , and the
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household labour supply Hht :
20
Ht = (Het )
1−Ω(Hht )Ω. (2.24)
Net worth of entrepreneurs is composed of entrepreneural equity Vt - the wealth gained
by operating the firm, - and of entrepreneurial wage wet . At the end of period t aggregate
entrepreneural net worth NWt+1 is
NWt+1 = γVt + wet , (2.25)
where γVt is time t equity value of entrepreneurs, who survive. Those entrepreneurs, who
don’t survive, consume their equity: Cet = (1− γ)Vt.
Entrepreneurs sell their output to final good producers at the wholesale price PWt , so the
gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods is Xt = PtPWt
and the marginal product of





Kt . Undepreciated capital is sold back to capital producers at the end of every
period, so ex-post aggregate return to holding a unit of capital from t to t+ 1 is the sum of










Demand for household and entrepreneurial labour is obtained by setting the respective
real wages wt and wet to marginal products of labour:











2.3.4 The optimal debt contract
I modify the conventional structure of the optimal debt contract as suggested by Bernanke
et al. (1999) to allow the bank lending rate be non-contingent on future shocks. In the origi-
nal formulation of the financial accelerator framework the risk of entrepreneurial default is
idiosyncratic and diversifiable, such that lending rate is contingent on future realisation of
productivity shocks. In the model here credit risk is non-diversifiable and lending rate in
debt contract is not made contingent on future productivity outcomes. Hence, in my formu-
lation zero-profit condition of banks is replaced with incentive compatibility constraint that
allows for non-zero profit outcomes for banks.
20It is assumed that entrepreneurs supply their labour inelastically (it does not enter their utility) with total
entrepreneurial labour input being equal to one. The share of income that goes to entrepreneurial labour is set
small enough in calibrations, as a result, there is no significant impact of this production function alteration on
my results.
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Entrepreneurs purchase capital, which is going to be used in production in t+ 1, in the
end of t. This capital acquisition is financed either through enterpreneurial net worth NWt
or by borrowing from banks Lt:
QtKt+1 = Lt + NWt. (2.29)
There is an idiosyncratic disturbance ω j to firm j’s return on capital, so that ex-post gross
return to capital of firm j is ω jt+1R
k
t+1. ω
j is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time and F(ω) is
a continuous cumulative distribution function over a non-negative support E(ω j) = 1 with
P[ω 6 x] = F(x). Information about a realized return to capital of an enterpreneur is private
and bank has to pay a monitoring cost to observe it. The monitoring cost21 is a constant share
µ of the realized gross return on capital of a firm: µω jRkt+1QtK
j
t+1.
ω¯ is as a cutoff value of idiosyncratic shock such that entrepreneurs, who receive any











t+1Lt. Entrepreneurs with draws ω
j < ω¯ default and receive nothing, leaving the bank
with (1− µ)ω jRkt+1QtK jt+1. Due to constant returns to scale assumption, ω¯ specifies, how
the expected aggregate gross return of entrepreneur Rkt+1QtKt+1 is divided between the bank













ω f (ω)dω, (2.32)
where Γ′(ω¯) = 1− F(ω¯) and µΞ′(ω¯) ≡ µω¯ f (ω¯). Hence, the net fraction of entrepreneurial
return going to the bank is Γ(ω¯)−µΞ(ω¯), and the share of return that stays with entrepreneur
is 1− Γ(ω¯).
The optimal loan contract maximizes the gross return on capital of entrepreneur subject





Et[(Γ(ω¯t+1)− µΞ(ω¯t+1))Rkt+1QtKt+1] = retLt/Etpit+1, (2.34)
where the incentive compatibility constraint formulates that the amount of real receipts of
the bank loan branch from issuing loans at time t is equal to repayments to the bank parent
21The monitoring cost is also referred to in literature as auditing cost or the cost of bankruptcy.
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branch under the rate of return that ensures the expected utility maximization according to
(2.8) and where ret is defined as:
retLt = Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + (1− µ)Vdt+1]. (2.35)
Hence, the lending rate rLt , the amount of loans Lt issued and the interest rate r
e
t that the loan
branch must pay back to the parent branch, satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
of the loan branch and maximize the entrepreneurs’ expected return at the moment, when
loans mature.







(1− Γ(ω¯t+1))(Γ′(ωt+1)− µΞ′(ωt+1)) + Γ′(ωt+1)(Γ(ωt+1)− µΞ(ωt+1)) , (2.36)
which, together with the incentive compatibility constraint, pins down the optimal choice of
capital Kt+1 and of the threshold value of idiosyncratic shock to capital return ω¯t+1. In its
turn, ω¯t+1 and the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shock, being time-varying in the
case of idiosyncratic uncertainty, specify the rate of default on loans, which triggers changes
in risk premium that the banking sector charges. Additionally, these optimality conditions
introduce the financial accelerator mechanism to the model: external finance premium in-
creases in the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs.
2.3.5 Idiosyncratic uncertainty
To introduce idiosyncratic uncertainty, I assume that the variance of entrepreneurial idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks ω is time-varying22. ω is distributed log-normally - as noted ear-
lier, ω ∼ log N(1, σ2ω), hence, the log of ω is normally distributed. I fix the mean of ω to
one, and define the variance of the log-normal distribution as (σId)2 = log(1 + σ2ω). This
variance σId is assumed to be varying and is affected by shock, which I refer to as the source




) = ρσ log(
σIdt−1
σId
) + σσeσt . (2.37)
σσ is the standard deviation of innovations to σIdt and e
σ follows standard normal distri-
bution. Positive innovations to idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks increase the dispersion of
entrepreneurial return to capital σIdt . The illustration of this increase is given at Figure 2.2:
higher variance of idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurs’ productivity changes the shape of
the distribution shifting the mass of distribution to the left tail even when the mean of the
distribution is unaffected. The intuition behind idiosyncratic shock is the following: the
22This formulation of idiosyncratic productivity draws from Christiano et al. (2010) and Dorofeenko et al.
(2008).
23Empirical evidence that corroborates dispersion of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial productivity as a source of
uncertainty has been provided, for example, in Bloom et. al (2012).
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higher dispersion of productivity implies a higher probability of defaults on loans, and given
costly state verification, a higher risk premium and lending rates, what leads to lower en-
trepreneurial demand for capital.
Figure 2.2: The effect of an idiosyncratic uncertainty shock.
2.3.6 Capital goods producers
A competetive sector of capital goods producers buys final goods from retailers as invest-
ment goods and existing undepreciated capital (1− δ)Kt from entrepreneurs and combines
them to create capital for the next period Kt+1, which is then sold to entrepreneurs24:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt. (2.38)
Capital adjustment costs are introduced to allow for the price of capital to vary, following
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Drawing from Christensen and Dib (2008), I adopt a quadratic
capital adjustment costs function, specified as χ2 (
It
Kt − δ)2Kt. The optimization problem of the
capital goods producers is to choose the value of investment It that maximizes their profits:
max
It




The first-order condition is




This standard condition of Tobin’s Q relates the real price of capital to the marginal adjust-
ment costs. Due to capital adjustment costs, the response of investment to various shocks
24I assume that capital producers rent the capital stock from entrepreneurs and use it to produce new capital;
since this rent and subsequent return of capital happen within one period, the rental price is supposed to be zero.
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slows down, which it its turn has an impact on the real price of capital. Variations in the
price of capital, absent if there are not capital adjustment costs, contribute to volatility of net
worth of entrepreneurs, what has a direct impact on workings of the financial accelerator
mechanism. Hence, (2.40) represents the supply of capital and the demand for capital from
entrepreneurs is formulated by (2.36) together with (2.34).
2.3.7 Retailers
The sector of retailers is introduced into the model to incorporate price rigidity. Specifically,
I adopt Calvo price setting framework. There is a unit mass of monopolistically competitive
retailers. They purchase wholesale goods from entrepreneurs at the nominal wholesale price
Pwt and resell them at their own retail price. Let Yt(i) denote the quantity of output resold by
retailer i and let Pt(i) denote the nominal price the retailer receives. Total final goods are a














where η > 1 is elasticity of substitution in the retail market.





The retailer chooses its sale price Pt(i) to maximize its profits taking as given the aggregate
demand, price level and wholesale good price.
To incorporate price stickiness, I introduce Calvo pricing such that retailers are free to
change their price each period with probability 1− θ. Let P∗t (i) denote the price chosen by
retailers who are able to change their price. The aggregate price evolves according to (see
technical appendix for details)
Pt = [θP
1−η




I assume that monetary policy instrument is the nominal risk-free interest rate rGt that the
central bank is able to set following the standard Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing,




) = ρr log(
rGt−1
rG
) + ψpi log(
pit
pi
) + ψy log(
yt
y
)− emt , (2.45)
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where pi and y are the steady state levels of inflation and output and emt in an i.i.d. white
noise process denoting monetary policy shock. It is assumed that the supply of risk-free
government bonds is perfectly elastic, such that any volume of demand for bonds from the
banking sector is met.
2.3.9 Market clearing
The final good market clearing condition states that total output equals the sum of house-
holds’ and entrepreneurial consumption, government spending, total resources used to cre-
ate new capital goods and the monitoring costs of banks:




I calibrate the model at a quaterly frequency, setting fairly standard values for the DSGE
model parameters. The discount rate β is set to 0.99 to target an annualized average risk-free
interest rate of 3.8%, what is the average rate of three-month Treasury bills in 1983Q1-2016Q3.
The capital share α is set to 1/3, the share of entrepreneurial labour income (1−Ω) is set to
0.01, such that the labour share of households (1− α)(1−Ω) is 0.66. The parameter of leisure
utility, ξ (1.87) is set to target the time that households spend working to 1/3. The elasticity
of substitution between final goods η is set to 5, and θ, the Calvo parameter, is set to 0.75;
these values imply that firms are able to adjust their prices on average once in four quarters
and that a steady state value of markup of 25%.
I choose the quadratic adjustment costs functional form of the capital goods produc-
tion function drawing from Christensen and Dib (2008), because quadratic adjustment costs,
being a type of smooth "convex" adjustment costs that increase in the squared rate of in-
vestment, do not generate real options effects of uncertainty on economy. I want to analyze
banks’ precautionary mechanism of uncertainty as the main channel of influence of uncer-
tainty on variables, that is why I aim at leaving aside other potential channels of impact. I
set the marginal adjustment cost parameter χ equal to 0.5882 - the parameter estimate from
Christensen and Dib (2008). Depreciation rate δ is set to its standard value of 0.025. The
steady state share of government expenditures in total output is taken to be 0.2.
The values for monitoring costs µ, for the steady state of the variance of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock σId and for the survival rate of entrepreneurs γ are set jointly to match the
data on entrepreneurial defaults (the average number of non-performing loans in 1988Q1-
2016Q1 equal to 2.23%), the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs of 1.84 (measured as the aver-
age value of total assets to net worth of nonfinancial corporate business in 1983Q1-2016Q2))
and the real rate of return on capital expenditures of 15.4% in the steady state (estimate of
Poterba (1998)). In that way, the fraction of realized payoffs lost in bankruptcy, µ, is set to
0.21 (a number inbetween of that from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) - 0.25, and Bernanke et
al. (1999) - 0.12), the survival rate of entrepreneurs γ is set to 0.95 (the value in Carlstrom
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and Fuerst (1997) is 0.947, and the one in Bernanke et al. (1999) is 0.97), while steady state
standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shock is set to 0.364 (somewhat higher than
in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) - 0.207, and in Bernanke et al. (1999) - 0.28). The steady state
annualized value of lending rate rL is set to 6.86% to match the average of prime loan rate on
historical data from 1983Q1 to 2016Q3. I draw the parameters of the Taylor rule followed by
monetary authority from the estimated values in Christiano et al. (2010): ψpi is set to 2.39, ψy
- to 0.36 and ρr - to 0.85. From Christiano et al. (2010) I also use the estimated parameter val-
ues for autoregressive process of the government expenditure and variance of idiosyncratic
productivity component of entrepreneurs25: ρg = 0.938, σg = 0.021, ρσ = 0.79 and σσ = 0.05.
2.3.11 Solution method
The traditional linear approximation of the model solution implies that uncertainty shocks
do not play a role due to certainty equivalence. For the variability of the second moment
to enter the decision rules of economic agents, a third-order approximation is used. As dis-
cussed in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010), the third-order Taylor expansion allows to sim-
ulate and to evaluate the effect of an uncertainty shock. I use the perturbation method to
solve the model.
Dynare 4.4 is used to compute the third-order approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state. As Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010) note, the third-order approximation
moves the simulated paths of states and controls away from their steady state values, be-
cause the expected value of the variables depends on the variance of shocks26. Hence, I
compute impulse responses as deviations from the mean of ergodic distributions of the data
generated by the model, rather than deviations from the steady states, as this allows to take
into account the second-order effects in a more comprehensive way. This approach is pro-
posed by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010) and is used in other studies investigating the
effects of uncertainty shocks (see, for example, Born and Pfeifer (2011) and Cesa-Bianchi and
Fernandez-Corugedo (2014)). The details of the computation of impulse responses functions
are given in the Appendix.
I employ the prunning procedure proposed by Kim et al. (2008) to deal with the problem
of explosive behaviour of the simulated time series when high-order perturbations are used
to approximate the solution of the model.
2.4 The effect of uncertainty shocks
In this section I analyse the effect of an exogenous increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty on
the model economy, and specifically, on banks’ portfolio allocation. I consider two versions
of the model - with risk-averse banking sector and with risk-neutral banks - to compare the
25Christiano et al. (2010) refer to idiosyncratic uncertainty shock as to ’risk shock’.
26As has been shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), the expected value of any variable in high order
approximations differs from its deterministic steady-state value.
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features of portfolio reallocation following a positive uncertainty shock for two specifica-
tions of banking sector preferences. I find that, first, idiosyncratic uncertainty shock makes
a significant impact of macroeconomic and credit variables; second, that banks’ attitude to
uncertainty makes a difference not only for portfolio allocation, but also for the dynamics of
aggregate investment and output, and third, that financial accelerator mechanism works to
amplify the effect of uncertainty shock. I analyse impulse responses to one standard devia-
tion increase of idiosyncratic uncertainty innovation (eσt ).Figure 2.3 plots impulse responses
of the model variables to an idiosyncratic uncertainty shock.








































































When a positive idiosyncratic uncertainty shock hits, it means that the dispersion of id-
iosyncratic productivity of entrepreneurs increases. This implies that some entrepreneurs
earn higher returns, while others bear greater losses. Hence, a greater fraction of entrepreneurs
are further on the left tail of the productivity probability distribution function, such that more
enterpreneurs are unable to repay their loans. As a result, the default rate on loans goes up.
This can be seen on the figure 2.3, Defaults section. Defaults increase by 15% for both risk-
neutral and risk-averse banks responding to a spike of idiosyncratic uncertainty. Due to
costly state verification framework adopted in this model, higher defaults imply that banks’
expected costs associated with bankruptcies go up, so banks of both types of specifications
increase their lending rates to compensate for it. Lending rate of the risk-neutral banking
sector goes up by 0.12 annual percent, while the one of the risk-averse bank increases it by
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0.38 annual percent, and 0.26 pp of difference between them is explained by the working
of precautionary mechanism. The higher cost of external debt induces entrepreneurs to re-
duce their demand for capital: firms borrow less and reduce their investment expenditures.
Specifically, loans issuance goes down by 1% under risk-averse banks specification, and the
issuance of loans of risk-neutral banks is 0.8%; 0.2% of the loans reduction is explained by the
banks’ precautionary motive. Notably, banks reallocate their portfolios following a positive
idiosyncratic uncertainty shock: the share of risky loans goes down by 0.8% in case of risk-
averse banking sector, and by 0.48% in case of risk-neutral banks with 0.32% of reduction
of the risky loans share being explained by the precuationary motive of banks. The share of
riskless bonds increases in portfolios of both types of banks: risk-neutral banks increase the
share of risk-free bonds by 0.43%, and risk-averse banks increase it by 0.64%. Again, there’s
a role for the banks’ precautionary motive, as there is a difference between the sizes of the
increase. Crucially, the deleveraging of entrepreneurs is observed, and under the risk-averse
type of banks preferences specification the reduction of the leverage is greater, than under
the risk-neutral type.
There are two counteracting forces that have a potential to drive the entrepreneurial de-
mand for capital. The partial equilibrium effect implies that the increased cost of borrowing
induces entrepreneurs to reduce their optimal choice of leverage, such that capital demand
also goes down. The general equilibrium effect takes into account that as a result of capital
reduction, following a spike in uncertainty, the rental rate of capital goes up. Hence, en-
trepreneurs have an incentive to increase their leverage to benefit from this high value of
capital return, which would give rise to an upward pressure on the demand for capital. The
model simulations show that the partial equilibrium effect dominates the general equilib-
rium one: the forces that bring entrepreneurs’ demand for capital down due to the increase
of the interest rate on loans overpower the general equilibrium incentives to build up lever-
age because the return on capital has gone up. As a result, entrepreneurial leverage and
investment fall.
The reduction of the demand for capital means that the price of capital goes down; the
resulting net worth of entrepreneurs follows the dynamics of the price of capital closely: in
both cases the negative impact of uncertainty with risk-averse banks exceeds the one with
risk-neutral banks, meaning that the precautionary motive of banks is at work, however, its
impact is rather small comparing to the impact on credit variables. Importantly, the rebound
of the price of capital and of net worth occurs after 4 quarters from the impact of uncertainty
shock. This rebound means that the demand for capital starts reviving after 3-4 quarters from
the uncertainty shock impact. However, banks continue keeping their lending rates high -
lending rates are still increased after 3-4 quarters from the shock impact, implying that the
supply of credit stays depressed longer than the demand for credit following idiosyncratic
uncertainty shock. Notably, the deleveraging process of the entrepreneurial sector continues
to occur beyond 4 quarters after the uncertainty shock hits.
The reduction of investment after the positive idiosyncratic uncertainty shock is sizeable:
it drops by 11% in the economy with risk-averse banks, and by 7.6% in the economy with
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risk-neutral banks. 3.4% - a substantial difference - can be attributed to the precautionary
motive of banks. Notably, the dynamics of investment following uncertainty shock - the
drop and the following rebound in 4 quarters, - is in line with the result in Bloom (2009) for
industrial production index. The decrease of aggregate output follows investment: it goes
down by 0.8% under risk-averse banking sector and by 0.6% under risk-neutral one, with
these results being roughly in line with the existing evidence on macroeconomic effects of
uncertainty shocks.
The presence of financial accelerator mechanism amplifies the effect of uncertainty shock.
In particular, due to reduced capital demand, the price of capital falls, making entrepreneurial
net worth go down, what reduces the demand for capital further.Lower investment forces
consumption to go up on the impact of uncertainty shock. A similar result is documented
by Bloom et al. (2012) and by Christiano et al. (2014). In the latter, they draw an analogy
of the effect of uncertainty shock to the increase of tax rate on capital return, which hinders
saving and investment, while boosting consumption, in a way similar to a spike in the tax
rate. However, the increase of consumption following uncertainty shock is clearly inconsis-
tent with data. A possible way to fix the positive response of consumption to uncertainty
shock in the model might be introducing the shock to the first moment - to the level of en-
trepreneurial productivity - simultaneously with the uncertainty shock. The reason to do
that is that in practice the cases of elevated uncertainty often go along with the negative first
moment shock, as suggested by Bloom (2014)27. Monetary authority responds to depressed
output by easing monetary conditions: nominal interest rate is reduced, what together with
heightened inflation implies decreasing real saving rate, such that households are encour-
aged to consume more and work less. After 2 quarters the negative wealth effect builds up,
weaker capital demand acts to reduce output further, so the consumption also goes down.
It features the additional 0.05% reduction after 6 quarters from the shock impact under the
risk-averse bank specification comparing to the risk-neutral case.
It is important to notice, that this model is aimed to study the workings of the risk premia
and risk aversion transmission mechanism of uncertainty with a particular focus on the pre-
cautionary motive of the banking sector. I reduced the amount of transmission mechanisms
via which uncertainty might have an impact in the suggested model deliberately. One has to
consider that this analysis is not supposed to be a comprehensive study of the effects of un-
certainty shocks and should take it into account while making interpretations of the results
obtained here.
To summarize, the suggested model produces significant negative effects of idiosyncratic
uncertainty shock on macroeconomic variables - especially, on investment. Considering two
versions of the model - with risk-neutral and risk-averse banks - allows to see that precau-
tionary mechanism explains a substantial additional share of dynamics of credit variables:
of the lending rate increase, of the decrease of the volume of loans issued, of the increase
of the share of portfolio invested in risk-free bonds and of the leverage reduction. Financial
accelerator plays a role and amplifies the impact of uncertainty shock.
27I refer to Figure 5 of Bloom (2014) here.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I propose a DSGE model with a portfolio-optimizing banking sector to ac-
count for reallocation effects in banks’ asset portfolios following uncertainty shocks found in
the previous chapter. I model uncertainty as a time-varying cross-sectional dispersion of en-
trepreneurial productivity. This modelling conforms with the evidence of portfolio realloca-
tion that I obtain as a response of banks to uncertainty shock, when microeconomic measures
of uncertainty is used, in particular, cross-section standard deviation of firms profit growth
and cross-firm stock return variation. I modify the standard financial accelerator framework
of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) to allow bank lending rates be non-contingent on
aggregate shocks. Risk-averse banks face non-diversifiable credit risk and, by invoking a
precautionary mechanism, increase risk premium following a spike in uncertainty by more
than risk-neutral banks do. My result is in line with the conclusions of the modern portfolio
theory, but the approach used here is advantageous comparing to that of the modern port-
folio theory in several aspects. First, the risk of investment is not measured by variance of
returns, but is a downside measure, what is a more adequate approach for the case of default
risk. Second, the don’t employ a quadratic utility function, but assume a more plausible rep-
resentation of preferences characterized by constant relative risk aversion. Third, I adopt the
general equilibrium approach, such that default risk is endogenous and also time-varying,
as well as risk-free rate not being known in advance and being determined endogenously
responding to movements in output gap and inflation. The suggested model allows to repli-




2.6.1 Credit market conditions
Figure 2.4: Bank credit growth
Note. The plotted numbers are year over year real quarterly credit growth figures. Source: BIS.
Figure 2.5: Bank credit growth, selected countries




At time t the balance sheet of the bank is:
Dt = Lt + Bt. (2.47)
The profit of the bank is the difference between its income and expenses:
EtΠt+1 = (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + (1− µ)Vdt+1 + rGt Bt − rDt Dt. (2.48)
Using the simplifying assumption that rGt = r
D
t in each period t, I rearrange the expression
for bank profit (EtΠt+1 = (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt+ (1− µ)Vdt+1 + rGt Bt− rDt Dt), between the third
and the forth lines below I use the balance sheet identity holding at time t:
Πt+1 = (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + (1− µ)Vdt+1 + rGt Bt − rDt Dt =
= (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + rGt Bt − rGt Dt + (1− µ)Vdt+1 =
= (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt + rGt (Bt − Dt) + (1− µ)Vdt+1 =
= (1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt Lt − rGt Lt + (1− µ)Vdt+1 =
= Lt((1− F(ω¯t+1))rLt − rGt ) + (1− µ)Vdt+1.


















t (1− F(ω¯t+1))− rGt )Dt] = 0, (2.51)
where I used the fact that αt = LtDt . Because Dt is chosen, and therefore, known at time t and
is a non-zero value, (2.51) means that the first order condition is actually
Et[Π−κt+1(r
L




t+1(1− F(ω¯t+1))] = rGt Et[Π−κt+1]. (2.53)
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By using the fact that rLt becomes known at t and applying the definition of covariance and
the linearity property of expectations to (2.53), I expand this optimality condition to
rL,RAt [Cov(Π
−κ





+Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))]] = rGt . (2.55)















Et[Π−κt+1]− Cov(Π−κt+1, (1− F(ω¯t+1)))−Et[Π−κt+1]Et[(1− F(ω¯t+1))]

















βk[ln(Ct+k) + ξ ln(1− Hht+k)] (2.57)
subject to budget constraint
PtCt + Dt ≤WtHht +Πt + rDt−1Dt−1. (2.58)
The first-order conditions for consumption, labour and depostis are:
βkC−1t+kP
−1





λt+k = Et+k[λt+k+1rDt+k], (2.61)












= C−1t Wt/Pt. (2.63)
Optimal debt contract
ω j is assumed to be i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time and follow log-normal distribu-
tion: ω ∼ log N(1, σ2ω). Thus, log(ω¯t+1) ∼ N(−0.5(σIdt )2, (σIdt )2). Given this assumption,
Bernanke et al. (1999) formulate the following distributions for the debt contract:
zt+1 =




Ξ(ωt+1) = ΦN(zt+1 − σIdt ) (2.65)












Γ′(ωt+1) = 1−ΦN(zt+1) (2.68)
where ΦN(· ) is the standard normal c.d.f.
Retailers









where Y∗t+k(i) is the demand in period t+ k given price P
∗
t . The first-order conditions from












where Xt is the optimal price markup such that Pt = XtPwt .
To implement Calvo pricing equations without log-linearization, I summerize the opti-
mal pricing equation with two recursive equations linked by the optimal pricing equation





t + θEt[SDFt+1nt+1] (2.71)
dt = P
η−1
t Yt + θEt[SDFt+1dt+1]. (2.72)








Let Pˆt = P∗t /Pt and F1,t = P
−η
t nt. From equation (2.71) F1,t is written recursively as
F1,t = YtX−1t + θEt[SDFt+1pi
η
t+1F1,t+1]. (2.74)









Let F2,t = P∗t P−ηdt = PˆtP
1−η
t dt. From equation (2.72) F2,t is written recursively as






Using variables F1,t and F2,t the optimal pricing rule is
F2,t =
η
η − 1F1,t. (2.77)
P∗t is the same for all the retailers in each period. Therefore, in each period 1− θ retailers
reset their price to P∗t and he aggregate price evolves according to
Pt = [θP
1−η




2.6.3 Impulse Response Functions Computation
In line with Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and the approach of Dynare to calculate im-
pulse responses, the following procedure was used to compute impulse responses:








t ) for 2096 periods. Starting
from the steady state, I simulate the model using et.
2. I disregard the first 2000 periods as a burn-in. Based on the last 96 periods, I compute
the mean of the ergodic distribution for each variable in the model.
3. Starting from the ergodic mean, I hit the model with a series of random shocks eWt for
96 periods. Simulation Y1t is obtained.
4. Obtain e˜Wt by adding one standard deviation to e
W
t in period 1 and simulate the model
starting from ergodic mean and hitting it with e˜Wt to get Y
2
t .
5. I obtain IRFs as Y2t −Y1t .
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Chapter 3
Financial frictions and robust
monetary policy in the models of New
Keynesian framework
3.1 Introduction
Model uncertainty is not a trivial problem in monetary policymaking, as stated by policy-
makers themselves, for example, in Greenspan (2004) and King et al. (2004). In particular, it
is often, if not always, the case that central bank does not know the true structure of economy
with full certainty, and thus has to allow for the possibility of economy to be represented by
several models. The phenomenon of model uncertainty could be illustrated by a situation
when the members of monetary policy committee do not agree on a model that represents
the true structure of economy. Thus, a decision on the stance of monetary policy that has to
be made by the committee has to be acceptable in all the alternative economy representations
in order to be supported by all the committee members. In other words, the policy adopted
should be robust to model uncertainty.
The particular relevance of model uncertainty is induced by the fact that in aftermath of
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 there is a growing debate about what amplification mecha-
nisms are conductive to economic distress. It has been widely acknowledged that financial
factors have significantly contributed into the recent economic decline. But which of the fac-
tors play the principal role in economic developments, is the subject to disagreement; consid-
erable uncertainty surrounds the "true" amplification mechanism. While there is a number
of studies revealing empirical relevance of financial accelerator mechanism, for example,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Mody and Taylor (2004), Peersman and
Smets (2005), Almeida et al. (2006), Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010), Cavalcanti (2010), there
is also evidence on significance of collateral constraints as a factor behind aggregate fluc-
tuations, for instance, in Fazzari et al. (1988), Gertler et al. (1991), Kashyap et al. (1994),
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard et al. (1995). Financial accelerator as a principal
factor behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has been advocated by Geanakoplos (2009) and
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Krishnamurthy (2010), whereas collateral constraints are supported by Chatterjee (2010) and
Peralta-Alva (2011 a, b). Other types of financial factors have also been suggested as poten-
tial drivers of the crisis: disruption of financial intermediation (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011), the transmission of contagion (Men-
doza and Quadrini, 2010), asset price bubbles (Farhi and Tirole, 2011, Martin and Ventura,
2011), credit shocks (Christiano et al., 2008, Del Negro et al., 2010) and other. As a result,
different models that incorporate financial factors have been developed recently.
Ultimately, there is no agreement about what financial factors are responsible for the re-
cent economic decline, so there is no consensus about what is the "true" model that captures
relevant type of financial frictions. Various models could be used as economy representa-
tions for analysis of monetary policy transmission mechanism with different degree of confi-
dence about them describing real economy. Hereby arises the relevance of the issue of model
uncertainty with respect to financial frictions.
Robustness of monetary policy to model uncertainty has been addressed by several method-
ological approaches. The first one, which was proposed in Brainard (1967) and developed
further in Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b, 2002, 2003, 2007), considers robustness with respect
to a benchmark model. Alternative models are supposed to lie around the benchmark at
some small distance; thus, the set of alternative models could be thought of as being "local".
Within this approach optimal policy is found by solving minimax problem for the "cloud"
of models, which surround the benchmark. This methodology is employed in a number
of works analyzing monetary policy robustness, for example, in Brock and Durlauf (2004,
2005), Giannoni (2002), Marcellino and Salmon (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002) and Tetlow
et al. (2001). In these papers the focus is on the small set of reference models. The mod-
els with significantly different perspectives on inflation persistence, expectations formation
and/or amplification mechanisms cannot be analyzed in the context of this methodological
approach.
An alternative approach to address model uncertainty is model averaging. It was ini-
tially advocated by McCallum (1988) who claimed that robust policy should be defined as
the one that works well enough in all the models considered; a robust rule might not be the
best one for any of the models in the set, but it should be acceptable (in terms of losses or
welfare costs) for all the alternative models. The principal value of this approach is that it
does not require alternative models to be close enough to the benchmark. This is important
for analysis of monetary policy transmission mechanism, because possible economy repre-
sentations are not necessarily similar. Indeed, there are distinct models of economy that one
would typically want to take into account, when looking for robust monetary policy; this is
the case of uncertainty about the factors that are behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009. That
is the reason why this chapter adheres to model averaging methodology.
Model averaging approach is adopted in a number of works with the aim of arriving at
an interest rate rule - Taylor rule or another type of simple rule, - which is robust across a
particular set of models. For example, Brock et al. (2007) examine uncertainty about the
suite of backward-looking models in style of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and hybrid
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models a la Rudebusch (2002), analyzing model uncertainty with respect to formulations of
expectations and lag structure, while Levine et al. (2008) study different variants of Smets
and Wouters model (2003). Levin and Williams (2003) search for a simple rule, which is
robust to model uncertainty across the set of non-nested models: the basic New Keynesian
model, the backward-looking model in style of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and a hybrid
New Keynesian model with backward-looking elements (Fuhrer, 2000). Most of these works
analyse the sets of models with competing perspectives about expectations formation and
inflation persistence.
The focus of this chapter is different, the goal is to present the results complementary to
those already existing in the literature. I aim to resolve the issue of model uncertainty about
the financial factors that could be included to a DSGE model; hence I analyze the models that
are different with respect to financial frictions incorporated in them. The models considered
here are similar with respect to presence of nominal rigidities, the type of market structure,
inflation persistence and expectations’ formation. This setup allows to see, what impact
do different financial factors have on welfare-optimizing policy rules. Second, it reveals
whether the difference between amplification mechanisms in the models is big enough to
generate non-robustness of optimal monetary policy rules. Relevance of robustness’ study in
this context is stipulated by the fact that adhering to a model that does not capture the "true"
type of financial frictions might entail harmful welfare consequences. Thus, I characterize
policy rules optimal for each of the models and evaluate welfare consequences of adopting
suboptimal policy rules in all the alternative model economies. I also attempt to find policy
rules that produce acceptable welfare outcomes in all the models considered: basic New
Keynesian model (BNK) , financial accelerator model (FA) and a model with housing and
collateral constraints (HCC); I assume that all the models have equal weights as possible
economy representations.
I show that policy rule optimal for the BNK model is not robust to model uncertainty:
welfare costs of adhering to it in alternative model economies featuring financial frictions are
significant, being particularly high for the HCC model. This happens despite the fact that all
the models considered adopt non-competing perspectives about expectations formation and
inflation persistence. To see the contribution of financial factors to non-robustness of BNK-
optimal rule I simulate the FA and the HCC models with financial frictions in them being
inactive. When financial accelerator and collateral constraints mechanisms are "turned off",
baseline New Keynesian optimal policy rule yields acceptable welfare outcomes in the FA
and the HCC models. Hence, the presence of financial factors is the source of sensitivity of
the FA and the HCC models and the reason of the baseline New Keynesian model’s optimal
rule non-robustness to model uncertainty.
I demonstrate that policy rules optimal for the FA and the HCC models are robust across
the model set considered: adopting them in all the model economies produces acceptable
levels of welfare costs. Despite the difference between the mechanisms of financial accelera-
tor and collateral constraints - the former works through interaction between the firms’ net
worth, the external finance premium and the resulting demand for capital, while the latter
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incorporates collateral constraints explicitly and ties the market price of housing to the abil-
ity to borrow by firms and households, - both the FA and the HCC models call for policy
rate to respond to fluctuations in output. In other words, optimal policy in the models with
financial factors requires direct output stabilization. This contrasts with optimal policy in the
basic New Keynesian setup, when a policymaker aims at price stability and targets inflation,
what is sufficient for attainment of the efficient allocation.
Finally, by employing the fault tolerance methodology, i.e. by considering welfare impli-
cations of deviations from the optimal policies, I obtain the set of policy formulations that are
robust to model uncertainty. I demonstrate that the significant increase of output coefficient
in the policy rule optimal for the basic New Keynesian model results in this rule being robust
in the FA and the HCC models. I also ascertain that modest changes of parameter values in
the FA and the HCC models’ optimal rules do not entail negative welfare consequences in
the alternative model economies. Additionally, increasing the coefficient of the interest rate
smoothing in both the FA and the HCC models’ optimal rules allows to improve welfare in
the BNK model.
Monetary policy is modeled here in terms of optimal simple interest rate rules that are im-
plementable, as, for instance, in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Faia and Monacelli (2005)
and Mendicino and Pescatori (2005). I assume that a policymaker is able to commit to a rule.
Rules’ simplicity means that policy rate is a function of a small number of easily observable
variables; implementability calls for unique rational expectations equilibrium delivered by
a policy rule. Optimality criterion I use is utility-based welfare maximization (as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2006 and Faia and Monacelli, 2005). This criterion differs from a conven-
tional approach applied in literature on model uncertainty, which is a quadratic loss function
minimization used, for example, in Cogley and Sargent (2005), Levin and Williams (2003)
and Cogley et al. (2011). Using welfare maximization criterion to estimate parameters of op-
timized simple rules allows to stay consistent with microfoundations of the models. On the
other hand, it is difficult to incorporate various preferences that a policymaker could have to
increase policy efficiency1. Aiming at consistency with the models’ microfoundations, this
chapter uses maximization of welfare as a criterion of optimality.
In presenting the results this chapter follows an extension to the model averaging ap-
proach proposed by Brock et al. (2007). This extension consists in reporting the welfare con-
sequences of adopting the optimized simple rules across alternative economy specifications,
such that the effects of model uncertainty are substantialized. Following the terminology
of Brock et al. (ibid.), I disclose the degrees of action dispersion - the parameter values of
the policy rules optimized for each of the models across the set, and the degree of outcome
dispersion - the evaluated welfare losses, associated with adopting the optimized policies in
the alternative model economies.
Another extension of the model averaging approach adopted in this chapter is the fault
tolerance methodology suggested by Levin and Williams (2003). The aim is to use the fault
1For example, Caplin and Leahy (1996) and Goodhart (1996) refer to institutional reasons why policymaker
might have a preference to avoid interest rate reversals. Lowe and Ellis (1997) advocate for importance of the
financial market fragility issue; they argue that it is critical that a policymaker take it into account.
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tolerance approach to ascertain, first, whether a robust policy could be obtained by an ap-
propriate amendment of non-robust monetary policy rules, and second, whether under the
robust policy rule welfare could be improved across the models by deviating from the opti-
mized policy. I propose an extension to this approach and evaluate how sensitive are model
economies in the welfare sense to deviations from the optimized policy rules, what enables
me to establish whether and how a policymaker could promote welfare in the alternative
economy representations by amending a particular policy rule she chooses to follow. I find
that a modified policy rule optimal for the BNK model is robust when the output coefficient
is sufficiently increased. Though, this modified policy rule is not an optimal one for any of
the models considered, i.e. it does not deliver the highest level of welfare in any of the them,
- it yields acceptable welfare outcomes in all the alternative economy representations.
3.2 Alternative model economies
To analyse the impact of different amplification mechanisms on monetary policy robustness,
the models considered here are similar in many respects but financial frictions. The suite
of models includes the basic New Keynesian model, the financial accelerator model and the
model with housing and collateral constraints (HCC). All the models are forward-looking,
do not incorporate inflation persistence and account for nominal stickiness and monopolistic
competition. In all the models monetary policy plays an active role in stabilizing economy
because of short-term nominal inertia. All the models are allowed to be hit by monetary
policy and TFP shocks. In what follows I briefly introduce the main characteristics of the
models2. Equilibrium conditions and parameters’ calibration used for simulations are given
in the Appendix.
3.2.1 Basic New Keynesian model
The basic New Keynesian model is a common reference in the monetary policy analysis. It
is often used an a benchmark in macroeconomic literature, because it combines in itself par-
simony, theoretical foundations, empirical relevance and practical usefulness. In its original
version as suggested by Clarida et al. (1999) BNK does not incorporate any financial factors
and accounts for purely forward-looking output and inflation; its dynamics is entirely due to
exogenous processes without endogenous persistence and outcomes depending on agents’
expectations. The baseline BNK model features no capital and investment.
The version of the BNK model considered here is taken in its standard form as in Walsh
(2010). Government spending is added to the model to introduce the demand side shocks,
which are absent in the model formulation of Walsh. Thus, three types of exogenous dis-
turbances are accounted by the BNK model here: monetary policy, TFP and government
spending shock.
2Detailed exposition of the models considered is given in Walsh (2010), Christensen and Dib (2008) and Ia-
coviello (2005).
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BNK model features a negative effect of interest rate on output. Current output depends
on expectations of future consumption expenditure. Nominal prices are set based on future
marginal costs; this indicates no inertia in inflation. Ultimately, inflation depends on move-
ments in marginal costs, associated with variation in excess demand. The monetary policy
rule that closes the model is presented in the next section. Gali (2008) and Walsh (2010)
demonstrate that the efficiency is fully restored in the BNK model, when monetary policy
aims to stabilize the economy’s average markup at its frictionless level.
3.2.2 Financial accelerator model
This model incorporates the financial accelerator mechanism developed in Bernanke and
Gertler (1989). The borrowers and lenders are modelled explicitly and are incorporated into
an otherwise standard New Keynesian setup with nominal stickiness and monopolistic com-
petition. Frictions arise due to the agency problem caused by informational asymmetries.
Specifically, the profitability of entrepreneurs, who borrow funds from risk-neutral banking
sector, is a private information. The costly state verification setup suggested by Townsend
(1979) is adopted, such that asymmetric information gives rise to agency costs, which are
often referred to as monitoring costs, that the lenders need to pay to observe the ex-post en-
trepreneurial productivity. In particular, when an entrepreneur cannot repay the debt, the
lender pays verification cost as a share of entrepreneur’s assets and takes over her entire
project. Bernanke et al. (1999) derive the optimal debt contract structure and show that the
entrepreneurial debt payment is independent of realization of her idiosyncratic productivity.
The model manifests the cost of external funds higher than the cost of internal funds, with
the former related to borrowers’ net worth inversly. The dynamics of net worth follows the
movements of the price of capital. Hence, the changes in the demand for capital affecting the
price of capital trigger the movements of entrepreneurial net worth. As a result, the level of
the external finance premium also changes, and this change reinforces the initial movements
of the demand for capital, such that the demand side shocks are amplified.
Importantly, the role of the financial accelerator mechanism in driving the changes of
demand for capital, and hence, investment, depends on the nature of the shock generating
them. As demonstrated by Christensen and Dib (2008), the financial accelerator propagates
and amplifies the effects of demand shocks, - like monetary policy, money demand and pref-
erence shocks, - on investment. At the same time, the financial accelerator pushes down the
response of investment to supply side shocks - for example, to technology and investment-
specific shocks. As emphasized by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen and Dib (2008),
investment specific shock allows to explain important features of business cycle data, and
hence is an important exogenous force driving the model.
Real distortions in the model imply that there is a trade-off for a policymaker between
inflation and output stabilization.
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3.2.3 Model with housing and collateral constraints
One of the sources of frictions in this model is the difference in discount rates of different
agents: entrepreneurs, impatient (or liquidity-constrained) and patient (or unconstrained)
households. As suggested in Iacoviello (2005), HCC model incorporates housing used by
borrowers - entrepreneurs and constrained households - as collateral. Hence, this model
accounts for an additional (as compared to the FA model) type of asset - housing, with
house prices affecting the borrowing capacity of the debtors. This relationship constitutes
a channel, via which the model’s endogenous propagation mechanism works beyond the
conventional Bernanke et al. (1999) financial accelerator channel. Constrained households
are assumed to have a strong preference for current consumption, such that growing hous-
ing prices induce more than proportional rise of borrowing and consumption, which in its
turn has an impact on aggregate output. Thus, the demand shocks are amplified in the
HCC model. At the same time, inflation depresses the impact of supply shocks that induce
negative correlation between output and inflation. So, the impact of supply shocks in this
model is contracted in the same way as in the FA model. In addition to monetary policy and
productivity shocks the HCC model accounts for cost-push shock, housing price shock and
preference for housing shock.
3.3 Monetary Policy and Welfare Measure
3.3.1 Optimized policy rules
I assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of interest rate rule - a plan for the
path of interest rate that a policymaker commits to abide forever. This rule provides a clear
policy objective, but in practice there is room for discretion. Interest rate reaction function
is simple, optimal and implementable as suggested by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). In
this formulation, interest rate should be a function of a small number of easily observable
variables. Second, this reaction function should maximize social welfare. Third, the rule
should deliver a unique rational expectations equilibrium. The type of policy rule I adopt is a
standard one, incorporating interest rate smoothing and a response to deviations of inflation
and output from their steady state values. In particular,
ln(rt/r) = ρ ∗ ln(rt−1/r) + αpi ∗ ln(pit/pi) + αy ∗ ln(yt/y) + et (3.1)
where rt is the gross nominal interest rate, pit is inflation rate, yt is output and variables
without subscripts denote steady state values of respective variables. I assume that a poli-
cymaker commits to the rule (3.1) and evaluates the parameters ρ, αpi and αy by maximizing
social welfare subject to the models’ equilibrium conditions.
The welfare associated with the optimized policy rule conditional on a particular state of







where E0 is conditional expectation over the initial state and C˜t and N˜t are contingent plans
for consumption and hours worked under the optimized policy rule. Analogously, the wel-
fare associated with the alternative policy rule conditional on a particular initial state of
economy is an appropriate aggregation of contingent plans for consumption and hours un-










The use of conditional expectation of the discounted utility of representative agent allows to
account for transitional effects from steady state to a path implied by alternative policy rules.
For each model I search numerically for the values of parameters ρ, αpi and αy that max-
imize households’ welfare. These parameter values specify optimized simple rules for each
model. Parameter ρ is restricted to lie on the interval [0, 0.99], αpi - on the interval [1, 3]
(values below 1 result in rational expectations equilibrium indeterminacy) and αy - on the
interval [0, 3]3. To implement this numerical search I solve the models by second-order
approximation of the policy functions around non-stochastic steady state. The parameters
of the optimized policy rules that maximize representative agent utility-based welfare are
shown in the Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Models’ optimal rules - utility-based welfare maximization
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.52 3 0
FA 0.16 3 0.78
HCC 0 3 0.86
Policy rule optimal for the BNK model features strong reaction to variations in inflation
(αpi = 3), no response to output gap (αy = 0) and a moderate degree of interest rate smooth-
ing (ρ = 0.52), what is a well-known result for this type of model; see, for example, the result
of optimal simple rules evaluation in Levin and Williams (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006) and Justiniano et al. (2013). The FA optimized rule is characterized by a sizable reac-
tion to deviations of output (αy = 0.78), strong responses to inflation (αpi = 3) and a relatively
small degree of policy rate inertia (ρ = 0.165). Rule optimal for the HCC model features the
strongest among all the models reaction to output fluctuations (αy = 0.86), strong reaction to
inflation (αpi = 3) and no interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0).
All the models’ optimized rules feature importance of inflation stabilization: αpi coeffi-
cient takes its highest value 3 across all the models. This happens due to nominal rigidities
present in all the models and due to inflation being forward-looking. Price dispersion is the
3These intervals are conventional for the search of optimal parameter values in the literature, see, for example,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). Values outside of these intervals are disregarded on the grounds that they don’t
result in non-negligible welfare improvement.
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main source of welfare costs in all the models, hence the call to minimize it. The optimized
rules differ in their values of ρ and αy. In the FA and the HCC optimized rules larger response
of policy rate to deviations in output and small/no degree of interest rate smoothing char-
acterize their aggressiveness. First, the presence of real distortions in the FA and the HCC
models implies that a policymaker faces the trade-off in output and inflation stabilization,
i.e. that the "divine coincidence" does not hold with respect to these models. The FA and
the HCC optimized rules call for sizable responses to output fluctuations, what makes them
more aggressive comparing to the BNK rule. In the BNK model optimized policy replicates
the flexible price equilibrium allocation (Gali, 2008); strict inflation targeting is optimal in
this model as policymaker does not face a meaningful policy trade-off. Second, the absence
or a very small interest rate inertia in the FA and the HCC optimized rules features their
aggressiveness, as it implies that policy rate should only react to variables’ fluctuations in
the current period with no backward-looking reaction component. This constrasts with the
sizable degree of inertia of the BNK policy rule that calls for more gradual changes in policy
in the short run4. Smooth changes in policy rate are welfare-improving in the BNK model,
because they facilitate monetary policy anticipation for the agents and thus improve short
run trade-off between output and inflation stabilization in absence of real distortions.
The origins of the differences in three optimized policy rules could be illustrated by the
differences in targets of policymakers identified in the attempts to approximate social wel-
fare in three models with quadratic loss function of a policymaker. While the utility-based
welfare measure of the BNK model is appriximated by the weighted average of inflation
and output variability5, this is not the case for the financial frictions models. Though, the
exact approximation of the social welfare in the FA model by the quadratic loss function of
a policymaker does not exist, it has been shown by Edge (2003) that lifetime utility-based
welfare of the model with endogenous capital (without the financial accelerator mechanism)
could be approximated by variances of inflation, output gap and investment spending gap.
It is reasonable to guess that approximation of the welfare measure for the FA model by the
quadratic loss function (if it exists) also includes investment spending gap, so that composi-
tion of output matters in this model6. Andres at al. (2010) argues that welfare losses in the
HCC model could be approximated by variability of consumption gap between constrained
and unconstrained households and the distribution of housing between firms, constrained
and unconstrained households in addition to variability of inflation and output. Hence, there
are differences in criteria, which are used to obtain optimized rules for the models consid-
ered: in addition to minimizing variability of inflation and output within the BNK model,
in the FA it is optimal (presumably) to minimize the variability of the investment spend-
ing gap, while in the HCC model - to minimize the consumption gap between constrained
and unconstrained households, while also taking into account the distribution of housing
between firms, and both types of households. Hence, the evaluated parameter values in the
4Significant degree of interest rate smoothing as an optimal monetary policy response has also been found in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
5See Woodford (2003), Gali (2008) and Walsh (2010).
6See Edge (2003) for details.
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optimized rules in the Table 3.1 reflect the differences in the optimization criteria.
To see the difference in the results obtained by using different approaches, I also use an
alternative way to find the optimized policy rules. In particular, I use quadratic loss function
minimization to get the values of parameters ρ, αpi, αy in (3.1). This optimization criterion is
commonly used in the literature on monetary policy robustness7. Period objective function
of policymaker takes the form:
L = var(pit) + λy ∗ var(yt) + λ∆rt ∗ var(∆rt) (3.4)
Social welfare in the BNK model is shown to be approximated by this type of quadratic loss
function8, what is not the case for the FA and the HCC models. To the best of my knowl-
edge, welfare in these models is not approximated by a quadratic type of loss function, due
to computational challenges arising from the relatively bigger size of these models and from
the presence of financial distortions is them. The use of quadratic loss function for the FA
and the HCC models to evaluate welfare costs could be justified by the fact that policy-
maker might have preferences for inflation targeting, interest rate smoothing and output
gap stabilization. In fact, the ability of the loss function (3.4) to capture different types of pol-
icymaker’s preferences makes this criterion more flexible than representative agent welfare
maximization optimization criterion, because it can be adjusted to account for various type
of policymaker’s preferences. For example, setting λy and λ∆rt to zero allows to consider the
case of strict inflation targeting policy. Setting λy = 1 enables to analyse the case of equal
preferences for inflation and output gap stabilization, whereas λy exceeding λpi is the case of
a stronger preference for output gap stabilization. Additionally, forgoing the idea that social
welfare is represented by the lifetime utility of a representative agent, could be regarded as a
flexible and beneficial characteristic of this approach, because it allows to take into account
inequality issues/welfare distribution considerations in the analysis. In any case, as sum-
merized by Levin and Williams (2003), there is no consensus about the "correct" values of
weighting parameters λy and λ∆rt . I use the loss function specification for the grid of values
for λy and λ∆rt : λy = 0, 0.5, 1 and 2 and λ∆rt = 0, 0.5 and 1. In this chapter I report the results
for two sets of preferences: strict inflation targeting, when λpi = 1, λy = 0 and λ∆rt = 0, and
inflation and output gap stabilization, when λpi = 1, λy = 1 and λ∆rt = 0.
Table 3.2: Optimized rules under quadratic loss function minimization: strict inflation tar-
geting.
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.85 3 0
FA 0.5 3 0
HCC 0.85 3 0
RS 0.7 2.15 1.5
The parameters of the optimized policy rules calculated to minimize the quadratic loss
7See, for example, Clarida et al. (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Levin and Williams (2003), Cogley et al.
(2011), etc.
8See Woodford (2003), Gali (2008) and Walsh (2010) for details of the derivation.
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function are shown in the Table 3.2 for the case of strict inflation targeting, and in the Table
3.3 for a policymaker’s preference for inflation and output gap stabilization. Using quadratic
loss function minimization as an optimization criterion, I include Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) (RS) macroeconometric model in the set of models. This is done to see the effect of
expectations about inflation formation on the parameters’ values of the optimized rule, be-
cause the RS model incorporates a significant degree of inflation persistence, being otherwise
similar to the BNK model9.
The results of using the loss function minimization to find the optimized policy rules
show that in case of strict inflation targeting all the NK models feature zero responsiveness
to changes in output: αy = 0, strong response to changes in inflation: αpi = 3 and a signifi-
cant degree of interest rate smoothing: ρ = 0.5 for the FA model and ρ = 0.85 for the BNK
and the HCC models. Comparing to the use of the utility-based welfare measure as an op-
timization criterion, there is a substantial difference: it is not optimal to respond to changes
in output, when the goal is to minimize the quadratic loss function of a policymaker. This
demonstrates that choosing a criterion for policy optimization is not a trivial matter. It also
provides an additional support for the considerations discussed above, in particular, that
a ’true’ quadratic loss function optimization criterion for the models with financial frictions
should incorporate additional components: presumably, investment spending gap for the FA
model and variability of consumption gap between constrained and unconstrained house-
holds and the distribution of housing between agents. Importance of responding to changes
in output, when utility-based welfare optimization criterion is used, is driven by taking into
account these additional components.
Another interesting result is, that when the model features by some degree of backward-
looking choices, it is optimal to respond to changes in output even in the case of the strict
inflation targeting. This is due to the fact that the optimal level of αy coefficiant for the RS
model has non zero value in constrast to all the other models: αy = 1.5, while the responses
to changes in inflation are less strong: αpi = 2.15.
Table 3.3: Optimized rules under quadratic loss function minimization: inflation and output
gap stabilization.
Model ρ αpi αy
BNK 0.7 2.2 0.4
FA 0.35 2.9 2.6
HCC 0.9 1.4 2.7
RS 0.1 2.4 2.6
The results in the Table 3.3 show that when a policymaker puts equal weights on sta-
bilizing output and inflation, all the models feature significant responses to deviations in
output, with the responses being the smallest for the BNK model αy = 0.4 and the largest
for the HCC model αy = 2.7. The responses to changes in inflation are smaller comparing to
strict inflation targeting case. This stands in the marked contrast with the results of utility-
9This model is not based on microfoundations, so it is impossible to analyse it in line with the BNK, the FA
and the HCC models, when utility-based welfare measure is used to optimize policy rules.
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based welfare maximization presented in the Table ?? and thereby emphasizes the critical
differences in policy rules optimized with respect to different criteria.
3.3.2 Welfare costs and robustness
Welfare costs λ are measured as a percentage of consumption that a representative household
would agree to be compensated with in order to gain the same level of lifetime utility as





βtU(Cat (1+ λ), N
a
t ) = W˜0 (3.5)
I evaluate welfare costs in each model by numerical search for λ over the grid so that con-
dition (3.5) is satisfied. I resort to numerical solution due to technical complexity of deriva-
tion of λ as a solution to (3.5) in the analytical form. In calculating welfare costs for the
HCC model I only account for welfare of patient (unconstrained) households; welfare of en-
trepreneurs and constrained households is disregarded as the fractions of their consumption
in the total consumption expenditure are negligibly small.
To draw inference about the rules’ robustenss, I simulate three model economies adopt-
ing all the optimized policy rules and evaluate welfare costs of adopting each of them. In
particular, I first evaluate welfare in the BNK, the FA and the HCC models applying alter-
native specifications of (3.1), when the latter are optimized for either model economy. Sec-
ond, I compute welfare costs of adopting the BNK, the FA and the HCC optimized policy
rules relative to the first-best policy rule in each model economy. In doing this I rely on the
second-order approximation of the model’s solution to account for the nonlinear dynamics
of the models10.
Table 3.4: Conditional welfare costs
Model BNK rule FA rule HCC rule
BNK 0 0.002 0.003
FA 1.16 0 0.001
HCC 7.67 0.06 0
FA no frictions 0.55 n/a n/a
HCC no frictions 1.66 n/a n/a
FA no frictions and model-specific shocks 0.21 n/a n/a
HCC no frictions and model-specific shocks 0.64 n/a n/a
Conditional welfare costs are measured by λ ∗ 100%.
The results of the welfare costs estimation according to (3.5) are shown in the Table 3.4.
The BNK rule adopted in the FA model entails welfare costs of 1.16% of consumption of a
representative agent, in the HCC model - 7.67% of her consumption. Using the informal
threshold of unacceptable losses at the level of 0.8 − 1% of consumption as suggested in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), I conclude that adopting the BNK optimized in the FA and
10Kim and Kim (2000) show, that the use of the first-order approximation yields inaccurate results for welfare
evaluation.
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the HCC models causes substantial welfare losses. On the other hand, adopting both the FA
and the HCC rules delivers acceptable welfare losses in the BNK, the FA and the HCC mod-
els. Assuming that suboptimal rule is adopted, i.e. a policymaker didn’t choose the model
that represents the ’true’ structure of economy to derive the optimized rule, the smallest
value of welfare losses are obtained when the HCC optimized rule is adopted in the alterna-
tive model economies: the welfare losses in the BNK model are 0.003% of a representative
agent consumption, while the losses in the FA mode are 0.001% of consumption. Hence, the
HCC optimized rule, featuring no interest rate smoothing and a significant output stabiliza-
tion, could be regarded as the first-best policy to adopt in case of model uncertainty about
financial factors. At the same time the HCC model is the most sensitive to suboptimal policy
formulations, due to the fact that welfare losses in the HCC model are the high, when the
BNK rule is adopted - 7.67%, and 0.06% under the FA optimized rule11.
The BNK optimized rule yields welfare detrimental outcomes in the models with finan-
cial frictions: 1.16% in the FA model and 7.67% in the HCC model, making this rule non-
robust across the set of the models considered. To check whether this non-robustness is due
to financial frictions, the BNK rule is adopted in the FA and HCC model economies with
financial frictions being inactive. I disactivate the financial accelerator mechanism in the FA
model by setting the zero responsiveness of the external finance premium to the level of net
worth position of borrowers, such that the borrowing costs are not related to the indebted-
ness of entrepreneurs. The resulting demand for capital does not depend of the leverage
position of borrowers. The FA model with the inactive financial accelerator mechanism is
a NK model with capital and capital adjustment costs. Hence, the presence of capital and
capital adjustment costs is what makes is different from the BNK model. In the HCC model I
disactivate the collateral constraints mechanism by closing the asset price channel, such that
the price of housing does not affect firms’ and households’ ability to borrow. Specifically, I
modify the housing/consumption margin conditions to make this amendment. Addition-
ally, I set that the debt in the HCC model is indexed, not nominal, as in its original version.
This is done to eliminate the debt deflation effect in this model.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the BNK rule being adopted by the FA and the HCC mod-
els, when financial frictions are disactivated in them. There is a substantial improvement of
the BNK rule performance across the other models, when the frictions are not active. The
FA model without financial accelerator mechanism features 0.55% of welfare losses, while
the HCC model without the housing and collateral constraints mechanism delivers 1.66%,
of welfare losses, what is substantially smaller than the losses in the full-version FA and
HCC models. Therefore, it can be concluded that these are the financial frictions that are
responsible for the BNK optimized rule non-robustness across the model set. As the next
step, I disactivate exogenous model-specific shocks that drive the model’s fluctuations to see
their contribution in the losses generated by following the BNK rule. The welfare improves
further: the losses in the FA model with no frictions and investment-specifc and preference
11A similar result of the most sensitive model yielding the robust policy rule has been obtained by Cogley et
al. (2011).
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shocks are 0.21%, while in the HCC model with no frictions and no housing and cost-push
shocks - 0.64%. Hence, a part of the high level of welfare costs generated by the full-version
FA and HCC models can be attributed to the workings of model-specifc shocks. Disacti-
vating the frictions and model-specific shocks in the FA and HCC models removes, at least
partly, the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization; this result is consistent with
the findings obtained by Justiniano et al. (2012). I conclude that this is due to model-specific
financial frictions and shocks in the FA and the HCC models, why the BNK optimized rule
featuring no responsiveness to changes in output is non-robust across the set of otherwise
similar NK models, with the impact of financial frictions being larger.
Importantly, the BNK model is not sensitive to suboptimal changes of the policy rule
adopted. In particular, when a policymaker responds to changes in output, following the
FA or the HCC optimized rules, the BNK model yields low level of welfare costs: 0.002%
of consumption of the representative agent under the FA optimized rule and 0.003% under
the HCC optimized rule. Thus, I conclude that comparing to the FA and the HCC models,
the BNK model is tolerant to suboptimal changes in monetary policy rule. I also show the
validity of this result in the next section by the means of fault tolerance analysis.
Interestingly, the FA and the HCC models are mutually tolerant to adopting suboptimal
policy rules: welfare costs of following the HCC optimized rule in the FA model is 0.001%,
while the costs of adopting the FA optimized rule in the HCC model are 0.06%. This result
is due to similarity of the FA and HCC optimized policies featuring responses to changes in
output.
To summerize, the FA and the HCC optimized rules are robust to model uncertainty
about financial frictions across the set of models considered here. Adopting these policy
rules in all the model economies yields acceptable welfare costs in the alternative model
economies with the costs being the lowest when following the HCC optimized rule featuring
a strong response to changes in output and no interest rate smoothing.
3.4 Fault tolerance
The fault tolerance approach is proposed for the analysis of monetary policy robustness by
Levin and Williams (2003). This is a method to evaluate sensitivity of the models to devia-
tions from optimal policy. Specifically, it is suggested that all but one parameter values are
fixed at their optimized values, while the remaining one is allowed to vary, such that welfare
costs are evaluated for the range of parameter values.
Let θ be the vector of the set of simple rule parameters θ =
 ραpi
αy
 and θˆ(A) denote the
model A optimized simple rule. The fault tolerance approach consists in evaluating welfare
costs λ according to (3.5) such that welfare costs are a function of θ: %∆λ = f (θ), where θi ,
i = {1, 2, 3} is allowed to vary, while θj = θˆj(M), for j 6= i where, M = {BNK, FA, HCC}.
Before discussing the results, it is important to take a notice of an extension to the original
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fault tolerance methodology that I implement here. In the original formulation of Levin and
Williams (2003) it is suggested to estimate welfare losses of deviations from the model’s own
optimized policy rule. In particular, for the model Mk, k = {1, 2, 3} the following deviations
are considered: θi varies, θj = θˆj(Mk).
My extension consists in evaluating welfare costs of parameters deviations from all the
optimized policy rules, not only for the model’s own one. Specifically, for each model Mk,
k = {1, 2, 3} the analyzed deviations are: first, θi varies, θj = θˆj(Mk), and also, θi varies,
θj = θˆj(Ml), where k 6= l. This extension allows to take into account all optimized policy
rules in the search of the robust one. This enables, first, to determine the parameters of
a robust policy rule (if there is one attainable), and second, to identify policies that could
improve welfare across the set of models considered. By using this extension to the fault
tolerance methodology I show how the BNK model optimized policy rule could be modified
such that it becomes robust to model uncertainty.
The results of using the fault tolerance methodology with its extension are presented in
the Appendix to this chapter. Allowing for changes of the value of ρ parameter in the BNK
optimized rule leads to divergent welfare outcomes. Lower values of ρ, a rule that features
lower degree of inertia, reduce welfare costs in the FA model (Figure 3.1 in the Appendix).
However, losses in the HCC model are not sensitive to any changes in ρ parameter as long
as other parameters take their BNK-optimized values θˆ(BNK) (αpi = 3 and αy = 0): welfare
costs are at their unacceptably high level of more than 7% for all the possible values of ρ.
Thus, changing the degree of interest rate smoothing in the BNK optimal rule does not help
to improve welfare in the HCC model.
Instead, the situation is different when changes of output coefficient in the BNK opti-
mized rule are considered (Figure 3.3 in the Appendix). Increasing αy from its optimal value
of 0 to 0.6− 1.2 reduces welfare losses in the models with frictions to their acceptable levels:
both FA and HCC economies generate welfare losses close to zero when αy lies on interval
[0.6, 1.2]. Hence, by modifying BNK optimized rule a policymaker could attain robustness
for the found set of values for output coefficient.
Increasing the value of ρ coefficient in the FA optimized rule from its optimal value of
0.165 up to 0.6 brings about reduction of welfare losses in the BNK model economy. At the
same time welfare losses on the HCC and FA models don’t increase much as a result of this
change, i.e. the models with frictions are tolerant to higher degree of interest rate inertia.
Thus, if the FA optimized policy rule is adopted by a policymaker, making interest rate more
inertial would result in improvement of welfare across the set of the models. However,
further increase of coefficient of interest rate inertia would result in sharp increase of welfare
losses in the FA model - see Figure 3.4 in the Appendix.
Changing inflation and output coefficients in the FA optimized rule doesn’t result in wel-
fare costs decrease (Figures 3.5 and 3.6): optimal values of the FA rule generate the smallest
possible welfare costs, thus, there is no need to modify them with the purpose of welfare
improvement; changes in inflation and output coefficients αpi and αy only lead to welfare
deterioration.
118
Fault tolerance analysis of changes in HCC optimal policy rule gives similar results as
deviations from the optimized values of the FA rule. Interest rate inertia coefficient ρ be-
ing increased up to 0.7 results in welfare improvement in all the models (Figure 3.7 in the
Appendix). However, for the values ρ > 0.7 welfare costs in FA economy increase up to un-
acceptable high levels, thus only values of ρ less than 0.7 are welfare improving. Deviations
of αpi and αy from their optimized values of the HCC policy rule don’t lead to any improve-
ment in welfare; the minimum welfare costs are achieved in all the models for the HCC rule
parameter values fixed at their optimized values.
To conclude, fault tolerance analysis enables to ascertain whether changes of parameter
values in optimized policy rules could lead to improvement of welfare. Modifying the BNK
optimized rule by increasing its output coefficient to any value in the interval [0.6, 1.4] makes
this rule robust. Though, the amended BNK rule is not optimal for any of the models, apply-
ing it in all the model economies entails acceptable levels of welfare losses. Besides, applying
the fault tolerance methodology enables to find out whether deviations of parameter values
in robust rules could improve welfare. Greater value of interest rate inertia coefficient in the
optimized robust FA and HCC policy rules (up to 0.6 in the FA case and 0.7 in the HCC case)
results in the welfare improvement in the BNK model.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that financial frictions matter for robustness of monetary policy.
It is shown that strict inflation targeting could be welfare detrimental in the models with fi-
nancial frictions. When there is uncertainty about what financial factors are at work and thus
it is not evident what type of frictions should be used in a reference model for monetary pol-
icy analysis, the basic New Keynesian model should not be used by a policymaker unless it
is appropriately modified. I establish that the BNK optimized rule yields high welfare losses
due to financial frictions present in alternative models. I show that the model with housing
and collateral constraints is the most sensitive to following the BNK optimized policy rule:
it suffers the highest welfare costs under this policy formulation. Policy rules optimized for
the financial accelerator model and for the model with housing and collateral constraints de-
liver acceptable levels of welfare losses in all the alternative model economies and thus are
robust to model uncertainty. Hence a policymaker minimizes the risk of welfare losses by
using either of the models as a reference one to obtain an optimized policy rule.
I demonstrate in this chapter how by using the extended version of the fault tolerance
approach suggested originally by Levin and Williams (2003) one can determine a specifica-
tion of policy, which is robust to model uncertainty across the set of models. Higher degree
of responsiveness to changes of output, i.e. sizable increase of output coefficient in the pol-
icy rule optimized for the basic New Keynesian model, results in this rule being robust as it
delivers satisfactory welfare outcomes across all model economies.
A number of questions should be answered in order to have a strategy to address the
issue of model uncertainty for the purposes of policymaking. First, it is crucial to establish,
what models should be used in the set of alternative economy representations. As seen in
the literature, for instance, in Cogley et al. (2011), Levine et al. (2008), Brock et al. (2003) and
Levin and Williams (2003), a specification of robust policy is sensitive to the set of alternative
models considered. Thus, it is critical to verify what models have to be accounted for in the
quest of robust policy. Relevance of this point increases in light of development of many vari-
ants of models with divergent financial factors aiming to capture mechanisms conductive to
economic distress. It is conceivable that not all alternative models should be considered as
possible representations of economy when looking for a robust policy rule. Second, the anal-
ysis here could be extended by monetary policy rule incorporating other variables (in addi-
tion to responses to inflation, output and interest rate deviations). For example, policymaker
could respond to changes in leverage ratio - this could improve stabilization properties of
monetary policy rules in the models with financial factors. Another extention of this paper
could be to analyse robustness with respect to other types of financial frictions, for example,
disruptions of financial intermediation, asset prices bubbles, etc., as these factors could pos-
sibly affect the results regarding robustness obtained here. Additionally, Bayesian updating
approach could be used, so that prior beliefs about the probabilities of each model being a
true one and their updating, potentially endogenous priors, are incorporated in the analysis
(as in Cogley et al., 2011 or Brock et al., 2007).
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Basic New Keynesian model
Equilibrium conditions following Walsh (2010). Variables without time subscripts denote
their steady state values.












1 = ω ∗ piθ−1t + (1−ω) ∗ p1−θt
x1,t = c1−σt ∗mct +ω ∗ β ∗ x1,t+1 ∗ piθt+1
x2,t = c1−σt +ω ∗ β ∗ x2,t+1 ∗ piθ−1t+1
pt =
θ
θ − 1 ∗
x1,t
x2,t
yt = zt ∗ nt
yt = ct + gt











) = ρ ln(
rt−1
r
) + αpi ln(
pit
pi




Representative agent utility function:
U(Ct, Nt) =
c1−σt




Table 3.5: Variables and parameters, BNK model
Description Notation
Household consumption ct





Real aggregate price level pt
Inflation pit
Gross nominal interest rate rt
Real wage wt
Productivity shock innovation ez,t
Shock to government spending innovation eg,t
Monetary policy shock innovation er,t
Auxiliary variables x1,t, x2,t
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi , αy
Table 3.6: Calibrated parameter values, BNK model
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.9902
Relative risk aversion σ 2
Weight of labour in the utility function χ 1
Labour supply aversion η 3
Calvo parameter ω 0.75
Price elasticity of demand for each good variety θ 6
Steady state share of government consumption g 0.17
Persistence of productivity shocks ρz 0.8556
Persistence of government spending shocks ρg 0.87
Standard deviation of innovation to productivity shock σz 0.0064
Standard deviation of innovation to government spending shock σg 0.016
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.0031
Note: The driving forces gt and zt are calibrated based on estimations of Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006). Monetary policy shock innovation is calibrated based on estimation of
Ireland (2004).
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3.6.2 Financial accelerator model
Equilibrium conditions, following Christensen and Dib (2008). Hatted variables denote log-
deviations of these variables their from steady state values. Variables without time subscripts
denote steady state values of these variables.
((1− γ) ∗ λ ∗ c− 1) ∗ cˆt = γ ∗ λˆ+ λ ∗m ∗ (r− 1)/r ∗ (bˆt + (γ− 1) ∗ mˆt)− γ ∗ eˆt
γ ∗ rˆt/(r− 1) = bˆt + cˆt − mˆt
h ∗ hˆt = (1− h) ∗ (wˆt + λˆt)
yˆt = α ∗ kˆt + (1− α) ∗ hˆt + (1− α) ∗ Aˆt
yˆt ∗ y = c ∗ cˆt + i ∗ iˆt
wˆt = yˆt + eˆt − hˆt
zˆt = yˆt + eˆt − kˆt
µˆt = mˆt − m̂t−1 + pˆit
fˆt = z/ f ∗ zˆt + (1− δ)/ f ∗ qˆt − q̂t−1
qˆt = χ ∗ (iˆt − kˆt)− xˆt
pˆit = β ∗ ˆpit+1 + (1− β ∗ φ) ∗ (1− φ)/φ ∗ eˆt
λ̂t+1 = λˆt − rˆt + ˆpit+1
k̂t+1 = δ ∗ iˆt + δ ∗ xˆt + (1− δ) ∗ kˆt
f̂t+1 = rˆt − pit+1 + ψ ∗ (qˆt + k̂t+1 − n̂t+1)




) = ρ ln(
rt−1
r
) + αpi ln(
pit
pi




êt = ρe êt−1 + ee,t
b̂t = ρbb̂t−1 + eb, t
Ât = ρA Ât−1 + eA, t
x̂t = ρx x̂t−1 + ex, t
To set financial accelerator mechanism inactive elasticity of external financial premium to
firm leverage ratio is appointed to be equal to zero: ψ = 0.












t ) + η ln(1− ht)
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Table 3.7: Variables and parameters, FA model
Description Notation
Household consumption ct





Gross nominal interest rate rt
Real wage wt
Lagrange multiplier λt
Real money balances mt
Aggregate capital kt
Aggregate investment it
Lagrange multiplier associated with production function et
Real marginal productivity of capital zt
Money growth µt
Inflation pit
Real interest rate on external borrowed funds ft
Price of capital qt
Weight of preference for consumption et
Money demand bt
Investment specific productivity xt
Preference shock innovation ee,t
Money demand shock innovation eb,t
Investment specific shock innovation ex,t
Productivity shock innovation eA,t
Shock to government spending innovation eg,t
Monetary policy shock innovation er,t
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi , αy
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Table 3.8: Calibrated parameter values, FA model
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.9902
Gross steady state risk premium S 1.0075
Gross steady state inflation rate pi 1.0079
Intermediate goods elasticity of substitution θ 6
Constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances γ 0.0598
Weight of leisure in the utility function η 1.315
Price stickiness parameter φ 0.7418
Constant associated with money demand shock b 0.062
Capital adjustment costs paramter χ 0.5882
Capital share α 0.3384
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Steady state ratio of capital to net worth k/n 2
Probability of survival of entrepreneurs υ 0.9728
Elasticity of external finance premium to firm leverage ratio ψ 0.042
Persistence of productivity shocks ρA 0.7625
Persistence of money demand shock ρb 0.7206
Persistence of preference shock ρe 0.6156
Persistence of investment efficiency shock ρx 0.6562
Standard deviation of innovation to productivity shock σA 0.0096
Standard deviation of innovation to money demand shock σb 0.0103
Standard deviation of innovation to preference shock σe 0.0073
Standard deviation of innovation to investment efficiency shock σx 0.0331
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.0031
Note: Calibration is based on estimations of Chistensen and Dib (2008).
125
3.6.3 Model with housing and collateral constraints
Equilibrium conditions following Iacoviello (2005). Hatted variables denote log-deviations
of these variables from their steady state values. Variables without time subscripts denote
steady state values of these variables.
Yˆt = c/Y ∗ cˆt + c′/Y ∗ cˆ′t + c′′/Y ∗ ĉ′′t + I/Y ∗ Iˆt
cˆ′t = ĉ′t+1 − r̂rt
Iˆt − ˆKt−1 = γ ∗ ( Ît+1 − Kˆt) + (1− γ ∗ (1− δ))/ψ ∗ (Ŷt+1 − X̂t+1 − Kˆt) + 1/ψ ∗ (cˆt − ĉt+1)
qˆt = γe ∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γe) ∗ (Ŷt+1− X̂t+1− hˆt)−m ∗ β ∗ r̂rt− (1−m ∗ β) ∗∆ĉt+1−φe ∗ (∆hˆt−γ∆ĥt+1)
qˆt = γh ∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γh) ∗ ( Ĵt+1− ĥ′′t )−m′′ ∗ β ∗ r̂rt− (1−m′′ ∗ β) ∗ (ĉ′′t −ω ∗ ĉ′′t+1−φh ∗ (∆hˆ′′t − β′′∆ĥ′′t+1)
qˆt = β ∗ ˆqt+1+(1− β) ∗ Ĵt+1+ i ∗ hˆt+ i′′ ∗ ĥ′′t + cˆ′t− β ∗ ĉ′t+1+φh/h′ ∗ (h∆hˆt+ h′′∆ĥ′′t − β ∗ h ∗∆ ∗ ĥt+1− βh′′∆ĥ′′t+1)
bˆt = q̂t+1 + hˆt − ˆrrt
bˆ′′t = q̂t+1 + hˆ′′t − ˆrrt
Ŷt =
η
η − (1− υ− µ) ∗ (Aˆt+ υ ∗ ĥt−1+µ ∗ K̂t−1)−
1− υ− µ
η − (1− υ− µ) ∗ (X̂t+ α ∗ cˆ
′
t+(1− α) ∗ cˆ′′t )
pˆit = β ∗ ˆpit+1 − κ ∗ X̂t + uˆt
K̂t = δ ∗ Ît + (1− δ) ∗ K̂t−1
b/Y ∗ bˆt = c/Y ∗ cˆt+ q ∗ h/Y∆hˆt+ I/Y ∗ Î − t+Rb/Y(R̂t−1+ b̂t−1− pˆit)− (1− s′− s′′)(Ŷt− X̂t)




) = ρ ln(
rt−1
r
) + αpi ln(
pit
pi




jˆt = ρj ∗ ĵt−1 + ˆej,t
uˆt = ρu ∗ ût−1 + ˆeu,t
Aˆt = ρA ∗ Ât−1 + ˆeA,t
ω = (β′′ −m′′β′′)/(1−m′′β)
i = (1− β)h/h′
i′′ = (1− β)h′′/h′
γh ≡ β′′ +m′′(β− β′′)
r̂rt ≡ R̂t − Etpit+1
γe ≡ m ∗ β+ (1−m) ∗ γ
s′ ≡ (α(1− µ− υ) + X− 1)/X
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s′′ ≡ (1− α)(1− µ− υ)/X
To close the effects of collateral constraints, housing/consumption margin conditions of en-
trepreneurs and impatient households are modified. so that the asset price channel is inac-
tive:
qˆt = γe ∗ ˆqt+1+(1−γe) ∗ (Ŷt+1− X̂t+1− hˆt)− ĉ′t+1 ∗ (γ+ 1−γe)+ cˆt−φe ∗ (hˆt− ĥt−1−γ ∗ (ĥt+1− hˆt))
qˆt = β′′ ∗ ˆqt+1 + (1− γh) ∗ ( jˆt − ĥ′′t )− ĉ′′t+1 ∗ β′′ + ĉ′′t − φh ∗ (ĥ′′t − ĥ′′t−1 − β′′ ∗ (ĥ′′t+1 − ĥ′′t ))
Representative agent utility function:
u(.) = ln(c′t) + j ln(h′t)− (L′t)η/η
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Table 3.9: Variables and parameters, HCC model
Description Notation
Output yt
Entrepreneurs’, patient and impatient households’ consumption ct, c′t, c′′t
Patient and impatient households’ labour supply L′t, L′′t




Price of housing qt
Real borrowing, lending bt
Inflation pit
Gross nominal interest rate rt
Preference for housing jt
Productivity At
Inflation shock ut
Preference for housing shock innovation ej,t
Cost-push shock innovation eu,t
Productivity shock innovation eA,t
Monetary policy shock innovation er,t
Auxiliary variables ωt, it, i′′t ,γh
Ex ante real interest rate rrt
Income shares of patient and impatient households s’,s”
Slope of Phillips curve κ
Coefficients in the interest rate policy rule on lagged interest rate, inflation and output ρ, αpi , αy
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Table 3.10: Calibrated parameter values, HCC model
Description Parameter Value
Discount rate of patient households β 0.99
Discount rate of impatient households β′′ 0.98
Discount rate of entrepreneurs γ 0.95
Weight on housing services j 0.1
Labour supply aversion η 1.01
Variable capital share µ 0.03
Elasticity of output to housing υ 0.03
Housing adjustment cost φe, φh 0
Variable capital adjustment costs ψ 2
Variable depreciation rate δ 0.03
Calvo parameter θ 0.75
Patient households wage share α 0.64
Loan-to-value entrepreneur m 0.89
Loan-to-value household m′′ 0.55
Steady state gross markup χ 1.05
Persistence of technology shock ρA 0.03
Persistence of housing preference shock ρj 0.85
Persistence of inflation shock ρu 0.59
Standard deviation of innovation to technology shock σA 2.24
Standard deviation of innovation to housing preference shock σj 24.89
Standard deviation of innovation to inflation shock σu 0.17
Standard deviation of innovation to monetary policy shock σr 0.29
Note: Calibration is based on estimations of Iacoviello (2005).
129
3.6.4 Fault tolerance analysis
Figure 3.1: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the BNK optimized rule
Figure 3.2: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the BNK optimized rule
Figure 3.3: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the BNK optimized rule
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Figure 3.4: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the FA optimized rule
Figure 3.5: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the FA optimized rule
Figure 3.6: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the FA optimized rule
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Figure 3.7: Fault tolerance to deviations of ρ parameter in the HCC optimized rule
Figure 3.8: Fault tolerance to deviations of αpi parameter in the HCC optimized rule
Figure 3.9: Fault tolerance to deviations of αy parameter in the HCC optimized rule
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Concluding remarks
I used several research approaches to analyze the relationship between uncertainty and fi-
nancial frictions. Chapter 1 examines the impact of economic uncertainty on asset portfolio
allocation of the banking sector empirically and demonstrates that a positive shock to un-
certainty induces commercial banks to increase the share of safe assets, while reducing the
share of risky business lending in their portfolios. It also presents evidence supporting the
existence of bank lending channel of monetary policy. Chapter 2 constructs a DSGE model
with a portfolio-optimizing banking sector and introduces the precautionary mechanism that
brings about increase of risk premium to self-insure against future reductions of profitability
following uncertainty shocks. Chapter 3 shows that when there is uncertainty about what
type of frictions is at work, a policymaker exposes economy to risks of significant welfare
losses by using a reference model without frictions as economy representation. Hence, it is
important that financial frictions are accounted for in the monetary policy analysis.
In this section I set out several suggestions for further study to improve our understand-
ing of macroeconomic effects of uncertainty under frictions related to banking sector activi-
ties.
• One can investigate what implications does the presence of uncertainty and changes
in volatility have for the design of optimal monetary policy. For that I propose that
the theoretical model presented in chapter 2 is employed after being amended to in-
corporate parameter time variation. I suggest that while modelling the banking sector
balance sheet, novel balance sheet items are introduced, in particular, bank equity cap-
ital and bank reserves. With this structure of balance sheets, preferences of banks could
be modelled as linear subject to capital adequacy and leverage requirements. This will
allow to take into account the risk of insolvency of banks and investigate the conse-
quences of introduction of macroprudential policy and its interaction with monetary
policy.
• The zero lower bound is not reached in the model simulations in chapter 2. However,
it would be interesting to see whether and how the introduction of zero lower bound
would change the theoretical result of the significant effect of uncertainty shock on ag-
gregate investment and output. In the current model setup the conventional monetary
policy supports output after uncertainty shock by the interest rate reduction. Assum-
ing that nominal interest rates cannot be decreased might change the results. Specifi-
cally, if nominal interest rate is at the lower point at the time of the shock and conven-
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tional monetary policy cannot be effectively used, uncertainty shock may have a larger
impact.
• As a robustness check of results obtained in chapter 1, one can use an alternative
methodology and identification to estimate the effects of elevated uncertainty and
study the effects of monetary policy on the volumes of credit by using the time-varying
parameter VAR with stochastic volatility. The characteristic feature of this approach is
that changes in economic uncertainty can be modelled endogenously as time-varying
volatility of macroeconomic and credit variables, without the reference to any specific
measure of macro or microeconomic uncertainty. This approach would allow to ac-
commodate the structural changes in relationships between the key credit and macro
variables, identified in Chapter 1, in a flexible and robust way. Time variation of the
variance covariance matrix of innovations would enable to model changes in policy, in
underlying economic structure and in their interaction.
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